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Abstract
Equality in p o litica l participation in the United States requires that a ll citizens, regardless
o f their social status or demographic characteristics be allowed to participate in the
system, regardless o f income or education. However, studies have shown several
variables - gender, race, income, and education — significantly affect any one person’ s
pathway to p o litica l participation and expression. Using data from the 1992 C itizen’s
Participatory Study, I examine these effects, especially in terms o f how these variables
affect the participation o f women. The findings show that education and income rarely
have the “ equalizing” effect in terms o f po litica l participation that is believed.
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION
Political Participation in America
Participation is the cornerstone o f any democracy. H istorica lly, most studies o f
p o litica l participation have analyzed voter turnout as the indicator o f participation in the
United States. Recently though, many studies o f the Am erican participatory process have
focused on the fact that voting behavior has been in steady decline since the 1960's
(Campbell, Converse, M ille r and Stokes, 1960; Burnham, 1982; Teixiera 1987). M any o f
these studies presented evidence that the voting population that did go to the polls was
unrepresentative o f the whole electorate, as those who were voting were m ostly white,
upper class, and highly educated. M any democratic theorists prophesied that the "end
was near fo r true participatory democracy in Am erica" (Verba, Schlozman and Brady
1997, p. 75).
W hile it is true that the U nited States lags behind other developed democracies in
voter turnout, Am erica leads other nations in terms o f other form s o f p o litica l
participation, such as campaigning, giving campaign contributions, becoming active in
the local p o litica l com m unity, attending protests, and w riting/phoning local, state, and
nationally elected o fficia ls. I f it is true that the vote is no longer the real measure o f
p o litica l participation, then matters become much more com plicated. Citizens no longer
have this singular, anonymous u n it o f input that counts equally (Verba, Schlozman and
Brady 1995, p.13). The comparison o f how much p o litica l power and clout any group
carries must now be measured in money, s k ill, and time.
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Consequently, many o f the latest studies concerning p o litica l participation have
shifted the focus from voting turnout to the examination o f various other forms o f
p o litica l participation. S pecifically, many scholars are interested in using alternative
forms o f participation as the measure o f how much p o litica l inequality exists among
groups - particularly those groups that have been treated unequally fo r a long period o f
tim e, such as women, A frican Americans, and Latinos. Verba, Schlozman and Brady
(1995, p. 15) define such inequality — whenever a group o f activists is unrepresentative o f
the public w ith respect to some p o litic a lly relevant characteristic — as ‘participatory
distortion.’

M inority Political Participation
H istorica lly, women, especially m inority women, have had unequal
representation in the p o litica l process, m ainly due to legal (and sometimes illegal)
restrictions. I f we are to believe just one o f the basic tenets o f participatory democracy- that is, everyone has equal voice in the p o litica l process- -this situation becomes
disturbing, especially when weighed w ith the knowledge that women (o f a ll races
combined) comprise h a lf o f the US population.
Previous research, especially that conducted by Sidney Verba and Kay Schlozman
(1993, 1994, and 1995), along w ith various other collaborators, has focused on how
po litica l participation has been unevenly distributed along the lines o f gender and race.
They fin d that these differences stem from factors such as income and education, as w ell
as the level o f participation in non-political activities, especially those connected w ith
religion. People w ith higher incomes have both more money and tim e to devote to
p o litica l activity, and those w ith higher education levels are more lik e ly to be concerned
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w ith p o litica l issues, and become active about them. They fin d that the people w ith all o f
these factors in their favor tend to be W hite men.

Explanations of Inequality
This inequality problem - that W hite men control most p o litic a l capital - can be
examined from the standpoint o f m ultiracial fem inism , w hich "focuses on the
intersectionality o f gender, race, ethnicity and social class" (Lorber, 1998 p. 134). Lorber
argues that these social statuses should not be examined alone, as they a ll construct a
social location whose average inhabitant is both oppressed and privileged. The
oppression may come from a social construction in w hich W hite men (as Verba and
Schlozman can attest) hold the spoils o f p o litica l power: better education, better jobs, and
higher incomes.
The difference in the p o litica l participation rates o f women and m inorities,
compared to men, is an im portant issue to m ultiracial fem inism , since the most
advantaged have greater control and influence over those in low er social locations on
p o litica l policy. The ideas and values held by the most advantaged group have a
stronger im pact on p o litica l p olicy (Lorber 1998, p. 135). As Verba, Schlozman and
Brady suggest, W hite men heavily influence every step o f public po licy, from agenda
setting, to form ation, to im plem entation.
Im portantly, a woman located in a social group may not be as disadvantaged as a
man in the same group may be (Lorber, 1998 p.134). A frica n Am erican women tend to
have better education and hold better jobs than their male counterparts. As there are
fewer resources to m onopolize when groups are in low er social locations, men and
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women tend to be more equal. But "as the group gains advantages, the men usually
advance over the women" (Lorber, 1998, p. 134).
Also, Lorber (1998, p. 134) notes that there is a different social “ map,” or
placement in the social structure, for men and women o f the same racial or ethnic group,
not unlike the different social map for Whites and non-Whites. The stratification on the
map w ill include everyone from the very wealthy to those who just struggle: and the
wealthy w ill tend to be W hite men, and those just surviving w ill be mostly women o f
color. I f it is true that the wealthy and highly educated seem to be in control o f policy
concerns (both Lorber and Verba, Schlozman and Brady contend that it is), the concern
now is how different are the political participation rates o f women as compared to men in
the same group.

Present P olitical Concerns
Assumptions made by m ultiracial feminists w ill suggest that African American
women w ill have different policy concerns and advantages than African American men,
since the women tend to have higher income and education. The same assumption holds
true for W hite and Latino women, although for different reasons. Also, there should be
some differences between the women in these ethnic categories. Both Lorber (1998,
p. 135) and Verba, Schlozman, and Brady (1995, p. 197) suggest that women o f each
category bring some different policy concerns to the political arena, especially in the
areas o f abortion, health care, and education. Given the different resources for these
women (W hite women have higher incomes, African American women have more
intangible resources, such as non-political activities), the differences between genders in
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the “ pathways to political participation” could prove to be statistically significant.
Money plays such an important role in politics, even more today in a postMcCain/Feingold world. Campaign contributors are often given preferential treatment by
politicians. I f this is true, then the preferred policies o f W hite women, which may be
different than those o f African American women, are the policies that w ill be given the
priority attention.
W hile Verba and Schlozman have examined how gender and race affect political
participation, they have not examined how the political participation rates o f W hite,
African-American, and Latino women compare w ith each other. This paper w ill discuss
such potential sim ilarities and differences. In keeping w ith previous research, the
variables that w ill be examined w ill include income, education, and level o f participation
in both political and non-political activities (Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1993, p. 19).
Three questions are posed: how do these three variables impact the political participation
o f women o f these races? What are the significant differences w ithin each group? Are
there any sim ilarities w ithin the groups? Does increasing income and education “ level
the playing fie ld ” between W hite, African American and Latino women, in terms o f their
gender and political participation?
Given the results o f previous studies, I expect to find substantial differences in the
political participation rates among women o f the three races. This is due to the fact that
White women have some policy concerns, such as the issues o f abortion, education,
which, according to previous research and discussed later, affect them significantly more
than m inority women. Plus, I expect to find that there are large differences between
women o f different races in regard to overall political participation.
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C H APTER 2: P O L IT IC A L H IS TO R Y AN D E N V IR O N M E N T
The W omen’ s Movement and Suffrage
Ever since A bigail Adams implored her husband John Adams to "remember the
ladies," as he headed o ff to draft the new Constitution, women have had to fight a
seemingly uphill battle to procure the same political rights and recognition as men. Many
o f the lim itations stemmed from society's recognition o f the man as head o f the
household; a woman would effectively render her husband's vote null, it was argued, i f
she voted for a different candidate. S till, other political leaders fe lt that to give women
the right to vote m ight contribute to their opponents’ success (Conway, Steumagel, and
Ahem, p.8). Nonetheless, many states allowed women the right to vote in school board
elections, as children's education was viewed to be more o f the woman's responsibility.
When women's suffrage began to materialize, it was often due to political reasons
other than the recognition o f women's political equality. W yoming was the first state to
allow women to vote in all elections, a right granted by the territorial constitution in
1869, in hopes o f drawing more women to settle there.
It would take the antislavery movement to move the fight for women's suffrage
into high gear. Elizabeth Cady Stanton and Lucretia M ott, founders o f the in itial
women's movement, were in attendance at the international anti-slavery convention in
London in 1840. W hile women were welcome at the convention, they were told they
could not be o fficia l voting delegates, which led to M ott, Stanton and other women to
spend much o f their time discussing the unfair social status o f women. They vowed to
change it.
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M ott and Stanton organized the Seneca Falls Convention, in which women
resolved to not only pursue the right to vote, but also to gain the right to an education, the
right to manage their own property after marriage and to have custody o f their children in
the event o f a divorce. Women were considered at that time to be too fra il and mentally
incapable o f pursuing a college education. Women were also expected to give over
ownership o f any property they had upon marriage to their husbands, and in the event o f
a divorce, children often went to the father, as they also were considered property.
Sixty-eight women signed the Declaration o f Principles at the meeting (Baker 2002, p.
27).
Women who followed Stanton and Cady in the suffrage movement fe lt the best
way to obtain these other rights would be to first obtain the right to vote. In 1869,
Stanton and Susan B. Anthony formed the National Woman Suffrage Association, mostly
due to the fact that Congress had not included the women's right to vote in the 14th
Amendment. One specific goal was to procure the right to vote for women, as w ell as
obtain social and economic rights. Lucy Stone quickly follow ed in establishing the
American Woman Suffrage Association, whose sole goal was the enfranchisement o f
women. The two organizations fin a lly merged in 1890 (C ollins 2003, p. 97).
Opposition to women's suffrage was strong, and at times, better organized than
the proponents. Southern political leaders, remembering the fierce participation o f
women in the antislavery movement, were staunchly opposed to granting women the
right to vote. Many religious organizations, especially the Catholic Church and many
fundamentalist Protestant Churches were also strongly opposed to women's electoral
rights. Opposition even came from corrupt political bosses and anti-temperance forces
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that thought the women's vote would lead to more honest government and support o f
outlawing liquor (Baker 2002, p. 48).
In 1918, Woodrow W ilson would give the 19 Amendment his fu ll support,
stemming largely from the lobbying o f Carrie Chapman Catt, who was the president o f
the National American Woman Suffrage Association. It was not until 1919 that both
houses o f Congress voted to pass the amendment. The long drive for suffrage finally
ended in 1920, w ith the ratification o f the 19th Amendment, which was 80 years after
Stanton and Cady began their mission to enfranchise women. Only one o f the 68 signers
o f the Declaration o f Principles was s till alive to cast a ballot in 1920.
Women may have won the fight for political equality in the sense o f "one person,
one vote," but the struggle for women's rights was far from over. Women obtained the
right to vote, and thus some measure o f political equality, but the struggle for equality in
other areas, such as employment, raged on. Women would again face discrim ination as
they entered the workforce.

The “ Glass C eiling”
The issue o f pay equity has also kept women from reaching fu ll political quality
w ith men. Wage discrim ination has occurred and continues to occur in several ways.
The wage scales o f jobs that are predominately fille d by men are consistently higher than
those jobs that are usually taken by women. Furthermore, men who are employed in
areas that are typically considered to be "women's w ork" are usually paid better and
promoted faster than are women. This problem has been addressed through the concept
o f pay equity and comparable worth. Many occupations (usually pressured by state laws
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or threat o f litigation) have evaluated the components o f the necessary skills and abilities
to perform a certain job. Components may include the amount o f education needed to
perform the job, the extent o f responsibility, mental demand, and w orking conditions.
These components are then assigned a point value. Follow ing this, jobs should be paid
according to the point scale, not the gender typically associated w ith the job. This has
served to both alleviate some o f the pay discrepancies, as w ell as draw attention to the
areas in which comparable worth has not been addressed.
Women who are employed in the areas that are typically considered to be "men's
work" average a better wage than those women in occupations that are typically
considered appropriate for them, but this is due to the fact that those occupations tend to
be in the higher end market to begin with. However, they rarely achieve the same pay
rate as men in the same occupation. Women tend to be told as w ell that they can achieve
the same success that men have in their occupations, given the fact that they have the
same m otivation, ambition, and capacity for jobs that have both prestige and power.
However, they tend to "top out" in the occupation before men — a circumstance that is
known as the "glass ceiling" (Lorber, p. 226). The US Department o f Labor defines the
glass ceiling as "those artificia l barriers based on attitudinal or organizational bias that
prevent qualified individuals from advancing upward in their organization into
management level positions" (M artin, p. 1). Further study by the Labor department finds
that the glass ceiling is lower than previously thought - women tend to stop receiving
promotions in middle management.
Once women are home, the inequality does not stop there. Having left their job at
the end o f the workday, women face the "second shift" o f w ork at home. Society still
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tends to view the mother/wife as the dominant caretaker and nurturer in the home, despite
the gains that have been made in the workplace. Men are s till viewed as the "junior
partner" in domestic care, as they are s till seen as the "dominant breadwinner." This
attitude tends to prevail in society despite the fact that most fam ilies cannot live on the
father's wages alone - the fam ily simply must have two incomes to survive at the same
level as in previous decades, due to the ever escalating cost o f livin g (Collins 2003, pp.
106-108).

African Americans, Suffrage and the C ivil Rights Movement
A frican Americans, both male and female, were not extended many o f the rights
that W hite men and women enjoyed until the 1960’s, despite the fact that the 13th, 14th,
and 15th amendments were designed to alleviate the political conditions in which African
Americans lived. The main problem w ith the 15th amendment was the wording - it stated
that the right to vote shall not be denied or abridged on account o f race, color, or previous
condition o f servitude. This vulnerable wording allowed many states to pursue avenues
o f political discrim ination. Many states instituted laws or codes that enabled them to
restrict voting to W hite men (and later W hite women) through po ll taxes, literacy tests,
grandfather clauses, and patriotism tests. States who were challenged that they were
illegally rejecting the 15th amendment argued they were not denying or abridging on
account o f race, but just wanted to guarantee that those voting were patriotic, intelligent,
and financially invested in the political system. The Supreme Court accepted these
arguments despite the fact that Whites were not required to meet these requirements
(Lawson 1986, p. 46).
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One o f the more troubling acts o f the Supreme Court was the method in which
they effectively rendered the C iv il Rights Acts o f 1866 and 1875 null and void. These
acts extended the C iv il War amendments to protect minorities in areas o f equal access to
theatres, clubs, and hotels, as w ell as legal rights in the courts (the right to sue, the right
to inherit property, the right to give testimony in court.) In 1873 the Supreme Court
stated that there were two distinct citizenships in America - one national, one state.
Therefore, these acts and the amendments were not state guarantees, only national. Ten
years later, they would further state that the national government could not instruct
private businesses to not discriminate (Stephenson 1911, p. 22).
The Supreme Court continued to be the policy making body that kept legal racism
in place. The m ajority opinion in the landmark case o f Plessy v. Ferguson established the
"separate-but-equal" doctrine that would dictate Court opinions for decades. The opinion
was so ingrained in the Court that not a single Justice would dissent from this precedent.
However, by the 1920's, literal interpretation o f the "equal" part o f the ruling would begin
the slow but steady progress toward more equality. Cases such as Sweatt v. Painter
would challenge the fact that most facilities were not equal, and therefore they should not
be forced to use them. Slowly, the Court began to accept this argument, and when the
cases o f Brown v. the Board o f Education I and I I came before the Court, the Justices
finally declared that "separate-but-equal" could not exist - by its very definition, the fact
that people must remain separate is in and o f itse lf unequal. The National Guard would
have to be activated in many states in order to uphold the Supreme Court's order to
desegregate the schools “ w ith all deliberate speed” (Lawson 1986, p. 34).
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Economic Equality and Affirm ative Action
The battle for equality in school attendance won, the c iv il rights movement turned
its attention to achieving equality in other areas. The boycotts and c iv il disobedience
advocated by M artin Luther King, Jr. attracted the attention o f Presidents Kennedy and
Johnson, who in turn promoted the expansion o f c iv il rights. Johnson's promotion o f the
"Great Society" produced several results: the passage o f the V oting Rights A ct o f 1965,
which ended the de facto segregation in voting rights; as w ell as the passage o f the 24th
Amendment (banning poll taxes in any election) and the Fair Housing Act, which banned
discrim ination in the rental and sale o f housing.
The economic equality o f A frican Americans would also improve w ith political
help. The passage o f affirm ative action programs assisted A frican Americans in
receiving jobs and promotions that had been long denied to them. However, the Supreme
Court and Congress has recently turned a more conservative eye toward the continuation
o f these affirm ative action programs. Aided by Republican appointees to the bench, the
Supreme Court has ruled increasingly in favor o f narrowing the scope and purpose o f
affirm ative action programs. In 1991, the Democratic controlled Congress attempted to
address the changes made to affirm ative action through a new C iv il Rights B ill. A fter
two attempts, President Bush fin a lly signed the C iv il Rights A ct o f 1991, which reversed
12 Court decisions that narrowed both affirm ative action and c iv il rights. Yet, today,
affirm ative action is again under attack by the Republican vanguard, now led by an
African-Am erican woman, Condalezza Rice (Lawson 1985, p. 102).
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Latinos and the New Economic Frontier
The Latino community has been in America fo r a ll o f this country's existence, but
until recently, had been contained mostly to Southwestern United States (California, New
Mexico, Arizona). Since the 1920's however, many more Latinos have entered the US,
looking for better jobs and wages. Many businesses welcomed them, as they were
viewed as a source o f cheap labor. S till, many people treated them w ith the same amount
o f discrim ination as A frican Americans. Soon, Latinos found themselves livin g in the
same poverty they sought to escape (Bakken and Farrington 2001, p. 154). One o f the
main blocks to their fu ll integration into American society has been the language barrier,
as they have had to learn a new language in order to operate in this society. One major
effect o f this has been the lower voter registration o f the Latino community, as they
sometimes cannot read or understand voting requirements.
One o f the other problems that Latinos face is the assumption that they are illegal
immigrants (Verba, Schlozman, and Brady, p. 161). Many have stated that this has been
the reason that they have chosen to not become involved in politics - out o f fear that they
w ill be seen as seeking "favors" or trying to impede the political process due to their
disenfranchisement (Verba, Schlozman, and Brady, p. 163).
In order to aid Latinos in their attempts to become more p o litica lly active, several
states have redrawn district lines in order to give Latinos an edge in capturing House o f
Representatives seats. Latinos now constitute 9 percent o f the House, but the legality o f
these districts is being challenged in the Courts, under the Shaw v. Reno decision that the
drawing o f district lines to enhance m inority election falls under the same ruling o f
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"racial gerrymandering", which is illegal. Whether or not these district lines w ill remain
is still uncertain.

The Future o f M in o rity V oting and P articipation
I f we take into account how d iffic u lt it was for these groups to achieve voting
rights, we m ight expect their participation in the voting booths to be higher. A fter all,
minorities had to fight to gain their entry into this basic political right, unlike White men.
Yet, their voting percentages have reflected national trends for the past few electoral
cycles, in that there has been a downward turn in electoral turnout for these groups.
S till, in the past three presidential elections, the female, A frican American and
Latino vote has been considered to be very crucial to Electoral College success, which is
most likely a reflection o f population growth (considering their voting levels are only
slightly higher than the national average). As such, both Democratic and Republican
candidates have courted these groups very heavily. Their political clout is being
recognized. In 2000, both Gore and Bush made campaign speeches in Spanish.
- Republicans targeted radio stations whose predominant listener base was African
American (97% o f A frican American voters s till voted for Gore). Both candidates sat
for talks w ith Oprah W infrey and the women o f The View. Obviously, these groups are
becoming a political force. From this, one could assume that the political participation
rates o f these groups should be or the rise, and it is. The important question now
becomes who is participation in what ways, and how much (Judis and Teixeiria 2002, p.
56).
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C H AP TER TH R E E : LIT E R A T U R E R E V IE W
As mentioned previously, there has been a tendency fo r researchers in political
science to focus solely on voting turnout as the measure o f political participation. Voting
turnout is easy to examine, thanks to state election returns and the work o f the National
Election Study (NES), which is a random sample o f Americans o f voting age where
respondents are asked questions about their political outlook, personal characteristics, and
participation in electoral campaigns. It is also assumed by many that voting is seen as a
perquisite o f being a good citizen, it is relatively easy, and it is considered a privilege by
many, one which was fought fo r by many oppressed groups. The abolition o f poll taxes
and literacy tests (which should have especially increased the voting rates o f African
Americans), the growing availability o f registration materials and ballots in Spanish
(which should increase Latino voting), plus the availability o f m ail registration, longer
pre-election registration periods, and the reductions in residency requirements and
absentee voting should increase voter turnout (Teixeira, 1992, p.29, see also Downs
1957). Therefore, it is assumed by many that if voting turnout is high, then political
participation is high. However, since the 1970’s, voting has been in steady decline.
This chapter w ill review several o f the studies that discuss voting decline, and
then w ill move into summarizing research in other areas o f political participation, such as
campaign volunteering and giving donations. A review o f works, especially those done
by Verba, Schlozman, and Brady, explaining the differences that education, race, and
income on political participation follows. An examination o f the theoretical concerns o f
m ulti-racial feminism concludes this chapter.
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D eclining A m erican V ote r T u rn o u t
W hile many previous scholarly works have examined voting as the major, i f not
sole measurement o f political participation, much research has been geared to explaining
both why some groups vote more often, and explaining why voting is in decline. The
reasons fo r declining voter turnout were the focus o f studies conducted by Ruy Teixeira
(1992) and Warren M ille r and J. M e rrill Shanks (1996), who used sim ilar methods and
data to examine the reasons fo r voting decline, but found different reasons fo r voting
decline. Both studies used data from the NES. Teixeira theorizes that the reason US voter
turnout has declined is due to the high costs o f voting (e.g. knowing when and how to
register to vote, the time actually spent registering, taking time o ff from work to go to
vote, knowing the candidates/issues, etc), when weighed against the perceived low
benefits o f voting (e.g “ my vote doesn’t really make a difference” ).
He concluded that these perceived low benefits, when contrasted w ith the high
costs o f voting, are the reason Americans no longer vote. Three trends in individual level
characteristics have led to this voting drop-off. Gains in socioeconomic status (for both
Whites and A frican Americans) actually drove voting turnout up. However, a substantial
decline in "social connectedness" has depressed the perceived benefits o f voting (see
Putnam, year?). This decline is demonstrated through a younger, less married, secular
electorate, who have a general disconnectedness from the po litica l w orld (people believe
less in government responsiveness, do not identify w ith either Democrats or Republicans,
and are less like ly to believe "that my vote w ill make a difference" (Teixeira 1992, p. 57).
Teixeira also challenged the notion that turnout has dropped the most among
those who are poor. The reality o f the situation is all groups - - the poor, the middle
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class, and the rich - - are voting less. Between 1972 and 1988, voting fe ll 8 percent for
those in the low income bracket, and fe ll 6 percent fo r those in the higher income
brackets (Teixeira 1992, p. 31). Therefore, the "representativeness" o f the electorate has
not changed. Also, the decline in election turnout has had no effect on the outcome of
election results (Teixeira 1992, p. 102). It also has not affected policy outcomes - the
differentiation between the policy preferences o f voters and nonvoters are not big enough
to seriously alter the type o f message elected officials are receiving about which policies
are preferred, which Verba, Schlozman and Brady assert to be false.
In The New American Voter. Warren M ille r and J. M e rrill Shanks (1996)
proposed different reasons for the decline in voting. W hile Teixeira stated that party
identification (or lack thereof) is not a reason for the decline in voting (Teixeira, 1992, p.
29), M ille r and Shanks argue that party identification (and thus the policies that each
party prefers) is a powerful motivator to vote. The reason why voting has not declined
more is that "party identification is only one o f a host o f themes relevant to vote choice,
but it ’ s the dominant predisposition in providing continuity in voters' perspectives and
behaviors from one election to the next" (M ille r and Shanks 1996, p. 512).
The authors also argued that one reason that voting is in decline is due to the
"replacement" o f voters from pre-New Deal (pre-1928) generation, who were considered
to be "habitual" voters, w ith those o f the post 1928 New Deal voters, who were not as
likely to vote. M ille r and Shanks investigated turnout among three different age groups:
pre-New Deal (eligible to vote in 1928 or earlier), New Deal voters (first eligible to vote
from 1932 to 1964), and post-New Deal (first eligible to vote in 1968 or thereafter).
They conclude that "generational replacement" has been the major cause o f voting
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decline. This "generational replacement" is caused by "social dynamics that produce life
cycle effects on turnout that is tied to the level o f engagement that marks a cohort's entry
into the electorate" (M ille r and Shanks 1996, p. 93). In other words, political events
(New Deal politics, the C iv il Rights movement) and political socialization are the reasons
why people w ill or w ill not vote (again, see Putnam 2000).
Based on these two studies, it seems that some o f our accepted “ truths” about who
votes and who does not vote need to be reconsidered, as does our assumption that voting
is the prime indicator o f political participation. These studies offered some evidence to
the contrary. Evidently, while the poor do not vote as often as the wealthy, their rates o f
turnout decline have mirrored those in other economic categories, at least according to
Texeireia. Further, according to M ille r and Stokes, party politics is s till thriving, not yet
completely turning voters o ff w ith the rhetoric and lack o f true policy solutions, as the
media constantly claims. W hile these two studies provide interesting insights into voting
decline, there are two very serious flaws. First, like many o f the other voting-as-politicalparticipation-measure studies, they do not provide any explanation as to why other forms
o f political participation, such as campaigning, contributions, and attending rallies and
protests, have increased - or if there are sim ilar participation ‘gaps’ across race and sex.
I f Teixeira is correct that it is sim ply not cost effective to vote, then perhaps these other
forms o f p olitical activity provide more benefits. I f M ille r and Shanks are correct, then
should it be assumed that individuals are not socialized to vote, but to participate in the
political arena in other methods? Also, how much o f the differences between women and
men (as w ell as across race) in levels o f political participation other than voting can be
explained by variations in levels o f education and income?

19

The second problem w ith these studies is that they tend to focus on the turnout o f
W hite men as the national norm. In the firs t edition o f The American Voter (1960, p.
232) M ille r, along w ith Campbell, Converse, and Stokes even go so far as to say the
voting behavior o f women and m inorities does not matter, since it tends to be lower and
has no serious impact on election results, which we know not to be true today.
This statement is indicative o f a serious flaw in both po litica l studies and public
policy - there has been a general disregard fo r women and m inorities, which has just
recently begun to be addressed by both scholars and government representatives. The
oversight is due largely because o f data lim itations, and the costs associated w ith
conducting a nationally representative survey o f m inorities that has prevented a great deal
o f scholarly research into these questions. Even supposedly “ groundbreaking” studies by
Margaret Conway (cited in this paper) did not provide an adequate sample o f A frican
Americans and Latinos. The Verba studies were so im portant because o f the oversample
o f not only women, but also A frican Americans (male and female) and Latinos (male and
female).

Feminist Democratic Theory
As there is a tendency to assume away the needs and wants o f subordinate groups,
avenues to greater political power fo r women and m inority groups must come in part
from reconstructing the ideas o f democracy to fit w ith the needs o f the group. Greater
political participation in the recent past has been more heavily influenced by W hite,
middle class women than it has by women o f color. Jane Mansbridge (1996) defines this
need fo r the subordinate groups to become more proactive as "the fem inist reconstruction
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o f democracy" (Mansbridge, 1996 p .117). Democracies tend to change only when some
mixture o f power and persuasion act upon it to make the change happen.
Mansbridge argues that women and m inorities must use this mixture o f power and
persuasion to make the democratic process more equal fo r them. Exclusion from the
same economic, social, and political power resources o f W hite men has caused them to
rely more heavily on persuasion. Women and minorities need to work now to develop
their power base, i f they are to share equally in the democratic process.
Mansbridge has proposed a democratic theory that fits w ell w ith the theories on
m ultiracial fem inism that suggest that social location inhibits the access to political
power. I f Mansbridge is correct that the battle fo r equality in the political sector cannot
be restricted to just the form al institutions o f politics, where should the battle begin?
Some recent research done in political science directly addresses the issue o f where and
how greater political power and participation may be gained fo r subordinate groups.

Empirical Research in Race. Ethnicity and Gender
Like Teixeira and M ille r and Shanks, most studies about political participation
tended in the past to focus on voter turnout, and tended to marginalize women and
m inorities’ participation. Yet, two major competing theories have emerged which
explore and attempt to explain both m inority and overall participation in politics.
Who Participates and Why?

Steven Rosenstone and M ark Hansen (1993) have proposed the m obilization
theory o f participatory decline in which they argue that the reason most citizens do not
involve themselves in the political arena is that they are not organized to do so by the
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candidates, incumbents and other holders o f political capital. In 1993, they published
M obilization. Participation and Democracy in Am erica, the culm ination o f a 10-year
study in which they examined the questions o f who participates in American politics
when others do not, and why.
Rosenstone and Hansen theorize that some groups w ill be targeted for
m obilization fo r several reasons. First, politicians, parties, and other activists target
people they know. They are close at hand and more like ly to respond in a positive
manner due to their personal relationship w ith the activist. They are also more like ly to
target people that are centrally positioned in social networks, as they are also visible and
are in contact w ith a higher number o f people (Rosenstone and Hansen 1993, p. 31).
Secondly, politicians and activists are more like ly to target people whose actions
are more like ly to produce the political outcomes they desire. They w ill also ask for
participation from people who are like ly to respond to their request, which means people
who have responded positively to previous requests. Thus, since po litica l activists cannot
afford to m obilize everyone, they target those in this pool o f known activists, and it
becomes unlikely fo r any group outside o f those aforementioned to be selected for
m obilization (Rosenstone and Hansen 1993, p. 31).
Predictions regarding who w ill be mobilized follo w from this. Those who are
employed are more like ly to be contacted, especially in large companies, where there are
likely to be many people o f roughly the same demographic make-up. People care about
their jobs and continued employment, so they are more apt to respond to political causes
geared toward that. Those who belong to non-political organizations are like ly to be
mobilized, as are the leaders o f those organizations. Finally, the authors argue that the
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highly educated, the wealthy, and those who strongly identify w ith a po litica l party are
more like ly to be contacted, since they have more resources and tend to already be
participants (Rosenstone and Hansen 1993, p. 241).
According to other studies, this strong identification w ith a po litica l party is
particularly im portant to m obilization. W ielhower and Lockerbie (1994, p. 225) found
that when parties are active in engaging potential voters, voter turnout increases. Not
only does voting increase when an individual is contacted by the party, but other forms o f
political participation, such as contacting political officials, increase as well.
Rosenstone and Hansen found support that those who are more like ly to be
m obilized fo r po litica l participation are those who are highly educated, have high levels
o f income, and are members o f non-political organizations. In short, since these are the
groups that are targeted fo r political participation by activists, the authors conclude that
the main reason that disadvantaged groups such as the poor and m inorities do not
participate as much in politics is because they are not asked (Rosenstone and Hansen
1993, p. 242).
Which Came F irst?

Rosenstone and Hansen have concluded, then, that the reason we tend to see more
political participation from those w ith more education, income, and interest in non
political activities is due to the fact they are sought out and asked to participate more by
those in elected office or other political apparatus. Sidney Verba and Kay Schlozman
(1993) have also recently explored o f the political participation rates, both w ith society as
a whole and focusing on m inorities. Like Rosenstone and Hansen, they find education,
income, and participation in non-political organizations to be strong motivators for
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political participation, but these findings have different reasons and significance. Their
research supports Mansbridge's claims that women and m inorities have been le ft out o f
the more powerful forms o f democratic participation, but disagree w ith Rosenstone and
Hansen that those who have the resources to participate w ill do so because they are
asked. Instead, it works in the other direction. Those w ith greater education, income, and
participation in other civic matters w ill be more active in politics, w ith or without an
invitation. As Mansbridge would assert, Verba, Schlozman and Brady find that these
resources tend to belong to W hite men.

Race and Political Participation
D uring the 1950’ s, the political participation o f A frican Americans was
substantially lower than Whites, due in most part to restrictions and barriers to their
participation. Poll taxes and literacy tests were part o f these forms o f legal barriers
erected by states after the passage o f the 15th amendment. A fter significant c iv il rights
legislation repealed these restrictions, the participation rates began to rise in some areas.
Before this, voting by A frican Americans had been less than a third o f that o f Whites.
A frican American voting h it an all time high during the firs t few years after the Voting
Rights A ct o f 1965. In the late 1970’ s, voting participation o f A frican Americans began
to dim inish, and now that decline is comparable to those o f W hites. Latino participation
is hindered by the obstacles o f language and legal status, especially now, given the recent
large influ x o f immigrants. Also, voter turnout fo r Latinos is in decline. The follow ing
table (Federal Election Commission 1998) demonstrates this trend. Given the fact that
most m inorities had to fig h t fo r their right to vote w ithout hindrances such as poll taxes
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and grandfather clauses, we should expect to see voting increase, especially after the
passage o f significant legislation in the mid to late 1960’ s that ensured the right to vote
for all people, regardless o f race or ethnicity.

W hite
African
American
Latino

1972
64.5
52.1

1976
60.9
48.7

1980
60.9
50.5

1984
61.4
55.8

1988
59.1
51.5

1992
63.6
54

1996
56
50.6

37.5

31.8

29.9

32.6

28.8

28.9

26.7

Clearly, voting is in decline amongst all groups. Verba, Schlozman, Brady and
Nie are interested in the rates political participation, outside o f voting, as it is obviously
no longer the most expressive form o f political opinion and involvement (Verba, et. al,
1993 p. 459). They examine the political participation rates o f two groups: AfricanAmericans and Latinos, as compared to Whites. They ask whether A frican Americans,
who have a long history o f social, economic, and political discrim ination, and Latinos,
who are relatively new to the American population through im m igration, share the same
resources for political participation (Verba, et. al, 1993 p. 455). This is an important area
for study, because if a group is not active because they lack the political resources
enabling participation, then the political equality o f the nation is threatened, especially
since African Americans, Latinos, and Whites vary greatly in their attitudes on political
matters, party affiliations, and needs fo r governmental policy and assistance
Their study uncovered that Whites and A frican Americans have some significant
differences in forms o f political participation, such as campaign contributions. In the
current political system, campaign contributions occupy a significant position, owing
much to the high costs o f television advertising costs. Therefore, whenever a group can
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make significant campaign contributions, they have a stronger chance o f influencing
public policy.
There is a more significant gap in Latino participation. They are substantially less
likely to participate than either Whites or A frican Americans in any area o f political
activity. This becomes noteworthy due to the aforementioned reasons o f accessing the
political system. Since most o f the growth in the Latino population is occurring through
im m igration and first-generation births in America, this group needs to be lobbying for
more governmental policies aimed at assisting their transition.

Resources in P o litica l P a rticip a tio n
Verba, et. al argued that political resources were an im portant prerequisite for
participation. They defined those resources as those skills and attributes that give a
person the ab ility to participate effectively in the political arena. These include
education, income, time, and command o f the English language. C ivic skills - those
skills that are derived from participation in non-political organizations, work and church were also assessed.
Obviously, education and income are important po litica l resources. Income
translates into not only the ability to make campaign contributions, but also to be able to
carry out other avenues o f p olitical participation, such as running fo r office. Education
usually translates to a higher paying job, and develops skills needed fo r both work and
community involvement. Hence, the correlation between education and income is
circular.
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Time is a commodity that, unlike education and income, cannot grow. Each
person has the same 24 hours delegated to them each day. Having more “ free tim e,” or
time that is not committed to paid work, enables people to assign themselves to other
avenues o f p olitical participation, such as volunteering fo r a campaign or w riting letters
to newspapers or Congressional members. Any activity that utilizes time is like ly to
dim inish the amount o f time that is given to political activity. Having young children in
the home is a good example. When a person has children to care for, they must make
choices on what activities he or she w ill be involved in, and often sacrifice, due to their
parental commitments.
Whites are s till ahead o f A frican Americans and Latinos in education, despite the
tremendous gains made by the two latter groups since the 1960’ s. W hites are s till more
likely to finish high school and college. This gives Whites the advantage, since education
helps develop skills that are relevant to politics, such as the ab ility to speak and write
w ell, as w ell as given the advantage o f obtaining jobs w ith higher earning potential
(Verba, et. al, 1993 p. 466-7).
Not surprisingly, they also discovered huge disparities in income levels o f Whites,
African Americans, and Latinos. M inorities have substantially low er levels o f fam ily
income than W hites do, m ainly due to the education gap. Concerning time, however, the
authors found very little discrepancy. Latinos have a little less free time, but it is not
significantly different. The socio-economic variables seem to have little , i f any,
independent relationship to free time (Verba, et. al, 1993 p. 469).
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When it comes to language, Latinos are at a distinct disadvantage as compared to
African Americans and Whites. The authors feel that this is due to the high number o f
immigrants that have just recently become American citizens (Verba, et. al, 1993 p. 470).
To assess civic skills, respondents were asked about involvem ent in non-political
organizations, i f they were employed, what type o f job they held, and i f they took part in
activities at church. In this regard, respondents were asked i f they had participated in
four different activities in the past in connection to work, church or volunteer activities:
written a letter, gone to a meeting where they took part in a decision, planned or chaired a
meeting, or given a presentation or speech. These civic activities give people a chance to
practice skills that are relevant to political participation. When a person engages in these
activities at w ork or a volunteer organization (charities or church), they are then more
comfortable when asked to engage in behavior to benefit a po litica l candidate or cause,
such as w riting letters or making phone calls asking fo r money, or making a presentation
to a local neighborhood group as to why they should vote fo r a candidate or referendum.
The study found that although they are as equally lik e ly to have jobs as are
A frican Americans and Latinos, Whites are much more lik e ly to have jobs where they are
able to practice these skills. When it comes to non-political organizations, though, the
gap narrows. W hile A frican Americans are not as like ly to be involved in these
organizations as W hites, when they are, they are as involved in the aforementioned
activities, especially church. Latinos are far less like ly to belong to organizations, and
less like ly to participate in these terms when they do (Verba, et. al, 1993 p. 477).
In regard to church a ffilia tio n , A frican Americans are more like ly to belong to a
church than W hites, and are also more like ly to be very active in the church in areas they
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can practice these skills. The study gives credit to the Baptist church in particular, for
driving up A frican American participation. Baptist churches are more like ly to engage
parishioners in activities that benefit the church as a whole - organizing church events,
holding fundraisers, etc. Most parishioners in these churches are “ plugged in ” to one or
more o f these types o f activities, as soon as they jo in the church. These activities w ill
require the parishioner to make phone calls, w rite letters, request money, and make
speeches and presentations on behalf o f the church. This type o f w ork develops these
skills, which is then transferable to the political sphere. W hile Latinos are less like ly to
be members o f a church, when they are, they are more like ly than W hites to attend. S till,
at church they are not as involved in skill producing activities. They tend to be
Catholics, and the Catholic church does not engage its members in activities as much as
the Baptist church. In Catholic churches, only “ elder” members, or members who have
been w ith the church fo r a significant amount o f time, are usually asked to assume roles
o f development or leadership. The avenues fo r developing these po litica l skills are not as
strong. Thus, Latinos are disadvantaged when it comes to all three spheres o f work,
church, and non-political organizations, as w ell as in education, language, and income
(Verba, et. al, 1993 p. 478).
In summary, Verba, Schlozman, Brady, and Nie have found that W hites s till hold
a lot o f political advantages over A frican Americans and Latinos. W hites are s till more
educated, and tend to hold jobs where they w ill be able to practice skills necessary to
political participation. They make more and larger campaign contributions than do
A frican Americans and Latinos, which is statistically important, fo r two reasons: donors
to political campaigns tend to influence public policy more than those who do not donate;
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secondly, the socio-economic status o f these two groups are hindered by racism and less
access to the higher paying jobs. However, A frican Americans are gaining advantages,
especially in the area o f political skill, due largely to activity in the Baptist church.
Latinos are s till the most p o litica lly disadvantaged group, lagging behind Whites and
African Americans in education, language, income, and non-political participation.

Gender and Political Participation
As there are differences in political participation and race, there are differences in
the ways men and women approach politics and participation. One only needs to
examine the past 3 presidential elections to ascertain that there are differences in male
and female preferences in governmental action. C linton’ s success was due in part to the
fact he addressed many “ women’ s issues,” such as health care, affirm ative action, and
education. Bush and Dole focused more on “ men’ s issues,” such as defense and tax
policy. C linton’ s success in 1992 and 1996 suggests that there may be significant policy
differences between genders. In their 1997 book Women and P olitical Participation:
Cultural Change in the P olitical Arena. Margaret Conway, Gertrude Steuernagel, and
David Ahern examined the increasing political participation o f women as an element o f
cultural change. Changing attitudes about gender roles and identity as w ell as appropriate
political behavior fo r women have lead to this increase in the political participation o f
women. The changes in political participation are often characterized by a difference in
political orientation (defined by these authors as a change in attitudes and preferences).
Men and women tend to have different policy preferences and issue agendas. The
authors put forth two different explanations fo r these differing political orientations
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between the genders. One possible explanation fo r the different policy preferences is the
differential treatment o f men and women in the fram ing and interpretation o f laws and o f
government rules and regulations (Conway, Steuernagal and Ahem 1997, p. 35). Subtle
forms o f discrim ination (the "glass ceiling") s till exist, although federal and state
governments have taken steps to eliminate the more overt forms o f sexual harassment and
discrim ination. Another possible explanation fo r the differences is religion, as beliefs do
affect political orientation. Many evangelical religions are based on a patriarchal
authority that would demand women to be less supportive o f "women's issues" such as
abortion and governmental assistance to improve the socioeconomic position o f women
(affirm ative action, governmental supports for childcare).
To examine whether or not these assumptions are true, Conway, Steuemagal, and
Ahem used data from the annual survey from the National O pinion Research Center.
This survey, done on an annual basis and using the same w ording fo r the questions every
year, analyzes the patterns o f men's and women's po litica l orientation and viewpoints on
a number o f policy issues. As expected, women are much less supportive than men o f
defense spending, the death penalty, foreign aid, and increases in spending on science and
technology. Women are more supportive than men in areas o f childcare, education, and
increases in governmental spending on aid to the poor (welfare, food stamps), college
loan assistance, environmental improvement, the homeless and abortion rights.
The authors also found significant differences in the support fo r affirm ative action
policies. Men tend to be significantly less supportive o f affirm ative action policies than
women. However, the degree to which men are opposed to affirm ative action policies
depends on age - younger men (18-29) are much more supportive o f affirm ative action
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programs (55% say they support them) than are men in the 65+ age group (only 39%
support). Support fo r the programs also depends on situation - men are more supportive
o f programs to help women and m inorities gain education and in itia l employment, but do
not feel it should be used fo r promotion practices. Women o f all age groups tend to be
supportive o f such programs fo r education, employment, and promotion (Conway,
Steuernagel, and Ahem 1997, p. 47). This is a significant difference, because most men
(at least those men who are W hite) are not in need o f the protections that are supplied by
affirm ative action programs. Women and m inorities are the ones in need o f these
programs, and i f they have fewer avenues to political activity, then the likelihood that
these programs can continue is lessened. However, i f younger men are more supportive
o f these programs than older men, the “ generational replacement” effect would actually
strengthen these programs.
Conway, Steuernagel, and Ahem (1997, p. 81) also found that employment and
education affect the political participation o f men and women. I f men and women are
employed, they tend to be more p o litica lly active (defined here as participating in at least
one political activity per year). The more education both men and women have also
impacts their po litica l participation - the higher the educational attainment level, the more
political activity. Like Verba, Schlozman and Brady, they attribute this to the fact that
those w ith higher levels o f education tend to be more interested in politics and have
developed skills necessary fo r successful participation in politics (the ab ility to deal w ith
bureaucracy, w rite w ell, speak w ell, etc.) (Conway, Steuernagel, and Ahem 1997, p. 85).
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Policy Preferences and P olitical Participation
W hile Conway, Steuernagel, and Ahern (1997) have found some compelling
differences in the political attitudes o f women and men, their study does not demonstrate
how these differences really affect participation, except to weakly demonstrate that
income and education w ill increase participation. Do these different policy preferences
and attitudes affect the manner and amount to which women (and men) participate in the
political arena?

Also, Conway, Steuemagel and Ahem do not measure differences in

policy preferences among W hite, African American, and Latino women, which could be
significant, given the fact that these groups often require different services from the
government.
Sidney Verba and Kay Schlozman have done the (arguably) definitive study on
the nature o f political participation differences between men and women. Having
explored the differences in differing participation among racial and ethnic minorities,
Kay Schlozman, Sidney Verba, and Nancy Bums (1994) turn their focus to the political
participation gaps between men and women. Verba, Schlozman, and Burns (1994)
explored whether a gender gap exists in respect to the resources that enable participation.
Previous literature suggested that women’s expanding role in society - s till responsible
for the m ajority o f household and child maintenance, but also now holding employment
outside o f the home - drains women’ s ability to participate in terms o f time and energy to
devote to political causes. They also expect to find that women also lack the money to
participate, in terms o f campaign contributions. Reasons fo r this include the fact that
women s till do not earn as much as men, as w ell as the rise o f single women headed
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households. Even in two income fam ilies, men s till tend to control how that money is
spent (Schlozman, Verba, and Bums, 1994 p. 964).
To discern whether these paths to political participation are gender specific and
whether there is a gender gap, Schlozman, Verba, and Burns again employed data from
the Citizen Participatory Study. They began by considering the same variables as in the
previous study: participation in non-political activities, free time, and income. Then, they
examine these variables to determine whether the pathways to political participation
differ fo r men and women, and determine whether these differences would remain if
women had the same amount o f political resources as men (Schlozman, Verba, and
Bums, 1994 p. 965).
Schlozman, Verba, and Burns found that there are hardly any differences in the
participation o f men and women in voluntary non-political activities. The only striking
difference is in church participation, as women are more like ly to be regular church
attendees and are also more like ly to give time to educational, charitable, and social
activities associated w ith their church. Men w ill be as active in church when serving on
the board or holding an o fficia l position. But, as demonstrated, church participation does
increase civic skills necessary to political participation. Once active in non-political
activities, women are more like ly to transfer those skills to the po litica l arena
(Schlozman, Verba, and Bums, 1994 p. 970).
Schlozman, Verba, and Brady also examined whether there are gender differences
in the resources o f time, money, and civic skills needed fo r po litica l participation. Men
and women have differing responsibilities in work and fam ily situations that w ill affect
these variables. Women usually earn less money, and they spend more time on childcare
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and household maintenance, so it would be expected that women would contribute less
time and money to politics.
Verba, Schlozman, and Burns (1994, p. 973) also fin d that when it comes to time,
there is very little difference between men and women in terms o f the amount o f free time
that each gender really has to dedicate to activities outside the home or work. The only
factor that lessens the availability o f free time is the presence o f pre-school children in
the home, but this impacts both genders. Thus, 'very little difference in the time each
gives to political activities. The amount o f free time only matters when determining how
much time w ill be given to political activities, once one is active in this area.
When it comes to money, though, women give significantly lower amounts to
political causes than men. Not only do they give less, they are less like ly to give
contributions in the firs t place. This is statistically important since political contributions
occupy such an important position in politics.
Thus, Verba, Schlozman, and Bums have found that the paths to political
participation are not as different as previous research suggested. Men and women
participate in non-political activities at about the same level, although women are slightly
more likely to transfer their skills developed there to the po litica l arena. Both genders
have equal time to donate to politics. However, women do make fewer and lower
campaign contributions to political candidates and causes.
Gender and D ivergent P o litic a l Avenues

Previous studies o f gender and political participation, like those discussed above,
have focused on how much participation, in terms o f quantity, there is from each sex,
rather than the nature, or quality, o f their participation. The particular characteristics o f
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participation could become important. Do men participate via different avenues than
women? Do they expect to gain different benefits from their political participation? Do
they participate p o litica lly fo r different reasons? When people have different reasons for
participation, it affects the quality and quantity o f the rate o f participation. A woman
who is lobbying fo r stronger penalties fo r repeat offenders due to the fact that her
daughter has been murdered by a serial rapist may bring different tone and passion to her
participation than a man. A man may bring a different point o f view to a discussion w ith
House members over the benefits o f a certain tax break than would a woman; the man
may focus on positive benefits (i.e, promotes business expansion) w hile women, more
motivated by social concerns, may wonder over the effects on public schools. As
suggested by the previous research above, men and women are definitely motivated by
dissim ilar policy concerns.
Kay Schlozman, Sidney Verba, Nancy Burns and Jesse Donahue (1995),
examined the hypothesis that men and women who are active in the political arena derive
different gratifications from taking part in the political process, and that men and women
also bring different policy concerns to the process (Schlozman, et. al, 1995 p. 267).
Previous literature has suggested that, as women are seen as more altruistic and maternal,
this w ill affect the policy concerns that they have. Schlozman, et. al, expected to find that
women are more like ly to tie their participation to community concerns, as w ell as child
and fam ily issues, human welfare, consumer, and environmental issues. They also
expected to find women participate to derive civic gratification, or a feeling as having
“ done their duty fo r community or country" from their participation. This reason for
political participation is opposed to the material gains, defined by the authors as career
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advancement or help w ith a personal issue, expected from men (Schlozman, et. al, 1995
p. 273).
Schlozman, Verba, Bums and Donahue (1995, p.274) actually found, contrary to
their expectations, that there were no significant gender differences in the type o f political
activities men and women are undertaking. Men are slightly more like ly to make
campaign contributions, contact public officials, and work inform ally to solve local
problems than are women. Women are also slightly less like ly to belong to an
organization than men are, especially if they take political stands. The findings fo r their
second questions are sim ilar. They find no statistically significant gender differences in
how important issues such as children and youth (except in education), basic human
needs, the environment, or crime or drugs figure into issue-based participation. The
authors did, however, find exceptions in the areas o f education and abortion. Women are
motivated into political activity by these two concerns at much higher rates than are men.
There were significant differences when Schlozman, Verba, Bums and Donahue
(1995) compared women differentiated by socio-economic advantage. Women that are
relatively advantaged (defined by the authors as those who have had at least a year o f
college and have a fam ily income o f 50,000 or greater) are more motivated by the
abortion issue than are men. Those women who are socio-economically disadvantaged
(defined by the authors as those who have no more than a high school education and
whose fam ily incomes are no more than $20,000 per year) are more motivated by the
issues o f basic human needs. Both groups are motivated by education concerns
(Schlozman, et. al, 1995 p.286).
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Thus, the authors found that there was statistically little difference in the
satisfactions and concerns that are derived from political participation. However, income
levels do play a significant role in what w ill motivate some women. Those women at the
higher ends o f the income spectrum w ill be more motivated by issues such as abortion,
while those at the lower levels w ill be more motivated by issues o f basic human need.
Schlozman, Verba, Bums, and Donahue(1995, p.287) conclude this article by
stating that it is no longer valid to ask whether men and women d iffe r in their levels o f
political participation. One must begin to ask “ W hich men? W hich women?" Indeed,
that must be the question. A study must now take into consideration the significance o f
race and gender together. Obviously, men and women hold different policy preferences
and political attitudes. It is also assumed that there are different policy preferences and
political attitudes among the races as well. What is characteristic fo r African-American
women may not (and most like ly is not, if this evidence is correct) be the same for White
or Latino women. As democracy is based on the idea o f the equal worth o f all citizens,
these differences in political equality need to be identified.

The Policy Concerns of M ultiracial Feminist Theory
As Verba, Schlozman, and Brady have discovered, there are disparities in the
levels o f political participation among W hite, African American, and Latino men and
women. As demonstrated, W hite men hold most o f the political capital in America.
However, this research also shows that the inequality in resources needed fo r political
participation exists at varying levels and intensities fo r W hite women and both African
America men and women. Most o f these disparities occur in matters o f income and
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education. W hile Verba, Schlozman, and Brady do discuss the political relevance o f
these varying levels, they simply demonstrate that they exist. In short, the bulk o f their
examination focuses on a symptom, not the cause. They do not undertake any
examination o f the social stratification that may cause these inequalities to exist in the
first place.
The Theory o f M u ltira c ia l Feminism

M ultiracial fem inism developed out o f socialist fem inist thinking which focused
on the capitalist patriarchy and how political economy shaped the subordination o f
racially ethnic women (Zinn and D ill 1994, p. 136). M ultiracial fem inism extended this
to an examination o f how gender, race, ethnicity, and social class are components in a
hierarchical social system in which upper class, W hite men and women systematically
oppress both women who are in lower classes, as w ell as men who are o f disadvantaged
races, ethnicity's and religions. Together these factors form a social location that cannot
be examined alone. Oppression may be experienced at varying levels and intensities in
these differing social locations, given the fact that there may be m ultiple systems o f
domination as the cause o f the oppression. A person's race, class, and/or gender w ill be
experienced differently depending on the social location (Zinn and D ill 1994, p. 138).
The social location o f a man or a woman o f the same racial, ethnic, or social class
standing may d iffe r in types o f oppression - a woman in one social group may be able to
get a job more easily than a man o f the same group may, due to different racial or ethnic
discrimination. As equality increases between men and women in a certain group,
though, men tend to monopolize more o f the resources (Lorber 1998, p.134)
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Lorber (1998) states that there are different social maps fo r each o f these groups.
One map that would show all groups would distribute these groups as clusters around the
map, w ith a clear pattern emerging: W hite men tend to be the wealthiest, and those "just
getting by" tend to be women o f color. The rest o f the groups w ill also be scattered
among the bottom levels o f the hierarchy. This is p o litica lly significant since the ideas,
values, and policy preferences that are held by the dominant group in the hierarchy tend
to dictate political agendas.
M ultiracial feminism examines "the intersectionality nature o f hierarchies at all
levels o f social life " (Zinn and D ill 1994, p. 138). Theories o f intersectionality stress the
fact that women w ill experience oppression at differing levels, "due to class, race, global
location, sexual preference, and age. The variation o f these intersections qualitatively
alters the experience o f being a woman - and this alteration, this diversity, must be taken
into account in theorizing the experiences o f 'women'" (Ritzer 2000, p. 337).
Intersectionality also recognizes that there is an ability through power and politics
to form methods that allow those who are dominant to suppress and control those in
subordinate positions, which is the central point o f oppression in m ultiracial feminism.
Ritzer (2000, p. 337) states that:
In social practice, dominants use differences among people to ju s tify oppressive
practices by translating difference into models o f inferiority/superiority; people
are socialized to relate to difference not as a source o f diversity, interest or
cultural wealth but evaluatively in terms o f "better" or "worse". As Lorde argues,
this "'institutional rejection o f difference is an absolute necessity in a profit
economy which needs outsiders as surplus people." These ideologies operate in
part by creating a "m ythical norm" against which people evaluate others and
themselves; in the United States society this norm is "white, thin, male, young,
heterosexual, Christian, and financially secure. This norm not only allows
dominants to control social production (both paid and unpaid); it also becomes a
part o f individual subjectivity-an internalized rejection o f difference that can
operate to make people devalue themselves, reject people from different groups
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and create criteria w ith in their own group fo r excluding, punishing and
marginalizing group members.
In general, m ultiracial feminism focuses on how theories o f intersectionality may
be applied toward women. Zinn and D ill (p. 139) make the argument that men o f
disadvantaged races, ethnicities, and classes, as w ell as women, experience differing
forms o f oppression and opportunity. Rose Brewer, Cecelia Conrad, and Mary King
(2002) demonstrate that race can become “ gendered,” and men who are o f different races
(especially non-Westem) become feminized. This fem inization may lead to a form o f
sexual discrim ination that is indiscernible from racial discrim ination: “ discrim ination
based on gendered visions o f race may explain the exclusion o f Asians, male and female,
from management positions fo r lacking ‘ leadership’ qualities” (Brewer, Conrad and King
2002, p.10). Thus, m ultiracial feminism should be extended to include these men, as
they are just as oppressed (although perhaps in different ways) by those at the top o f the
social hierarchy.
An examination o f two different examples can demonstrate how this plays out in
everyday life. Ian Ayes (1994) did an experiment to demonstrate this theory in action.
They sent 4 different people into a car dealership to inquire about buying a certain
vehicle. The study used one W hite man, one W hite woman, one A frican American man,
and one African American woman. The W hite male was sent in first, and quoted a price
for the vehicle. It is assumed that this is the true price o f the car. The W hite woman is
sent on a few hours later to ask the same price o f the vehicle. It is slightly higher than the
price that was quoted to the W hite male just a few hours earlier. Next, the African
American man goes into the dealership and is quoted a price that is higher than the one
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the W hite woman was asked to pay. Finally, the A frican American woman is quoted the
highest price for the vehicle. Ayes (1994) concluded that “ a revenue-based explanation
might be based on inferences the sellers make about blacks' or women's willingness to
bargain. I f a customer is believed to be averse to bargaining, it may be inferred that they
would be less w illin g to bargain elsewhere. Thus, a seller could offer a higher final
price,” as minorities and women are taught not to argue w ith the dominate class, that
being W hite males. This demonstrates that on a daily basis, m inorities (especially when
it is a m inority woman) experience a different level o f oppressive techniques that is not
faced by the dominant class.
We can clearly see also how appears in the legal system. A 1996 study by the
nonprofit Center on Juvenile and Crim inal Justice reports that w hile A frican Americans
and Whites use illegal drugs at about the same rate, A frican Americans are arrested,
charged, and tried fo r drug charges at a rate 5 times higher than that fo r Whites. African
Americans were charged under C alifornia’ s “ three strikes” law at a rate o f 17 times
higher than Whites. The lead investigator o f the study, Vincent Schiraldi, states that this
demonstrates the principles o f m ultiracial feminism:
I am not accusing judges or district attorneys o f being Ku K lux Klan members. I
am talking about a subtler form o f institutional racism. And the difference to me
is that more young white men were under the control o f the crim inal justice
system, we would not be passing 'three-strikes' [laws] or building more prisons.
We would be funding education, jobs and drug treatment.
This inequality does not extend only to African American men. A 1997 study by the U.S.
Department o f Justice found that women were over represented among low level drug
offenders who were non-violent, had minim al or no prior crim inal history, and were not
principal figures in crim inal organizations or activities, but nevertheless received
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sentences sim ilar to “ high level” drug offenders under the mandatory sentencing policies.
The bottom line is that W hite males are arrested, charged and tried less than women and
minorities, and serve less time when they do go to ja il. M ultiracial feminism
demonstrates how this occurs, as in general W hite males are the ones who set law and
policy in the United States. Members o f this race and gender then reap the benefits and
rewards o f this agenda setting.
M ultiracial feminism also "explores the interplay o f social structure and women's
agency," which examines the methods in which women are able to carve out viable lives
for not only themselves, but also fo r their fam ilies and communities. Women, especially
women o f color, have been able to use many different methods to do this, from outright
protest to subtler but yet determined methods. These methods o f putting their respective
agendas on the social stage becomes po litica lly important, as these subordinate groups
tend to have less influence unless they can capture the attention o f both the dominant
group and those in political power (which are often one and the same).
Thus, this theory explains the reasons for the inequality in political participation
that Verba, Schlozman, and Brady have found. M ultiracial fem inism explains how the
race, ethnicity, and gender o f a person form a social location in which oppression and
domination may be experienced at different levels and intensity. This not only affects
affecting paths to political participation, but the entire social structure in which a person
resides. W hile this theory focuses more on women, it should include men o f
disadvantaged races, as they are often as oppressed as women.
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C H AP TER 4: A N A L Y T IC A L F R A M E W O R K
Restatement o f Theory and Introduction o f Hypotheses
M ultiracial feminism argues that race, ethnicity, and gender form a social location
that must be examined as a whole, since these social statuses form a social location that
experiences m ultiple systems o f domination. A "m ythical norm" is often created by the
dominant group in societies, by which all others outside the norm are judged. This
allows fo r the exclusion and domination for those outside the norm (in this case, women,
African Americans and Latinos). In the United States, this norm is white, wealthy, and
male. As a result, W hite men tend to be the dominant group in America.
This domination is experienced in all realms o f society, but especially in politics.
As demonstrated in the literature review, W hite men tend to dominate in both avenues o f
politics, as they both set the political agenda and public policy through their occupation
o f legal and governmental offices, and they tend to control more o f the resources needed
to actively engage in politics. This leads to the marginalization o f the issues faced by
women and minorities.
However, women and m inorities have made great strides in obtaining more
equality fo r themselves. Much o f this owed to the growing income and education levels
o f women and m inorities. The work done prim arily by Sidney Verba and Kay
Schlozman demonstrates that there is some correlation between an increase education and
income w ith rising political participation. Some o f their evidence suggests that when
education and income rise, levels o f political participation equalize amongst W hite,
African American and Latinos.
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Hypotheses and Propositions

H 1: I expect to fin d that greater income tends to make women o f a ll races more
p o litica lly active; and
H 2: I expect to fin d that increasing education tends to make women o f a ll three races
more p o litica lly active.
Verba, Schlozman, and Brady (1994) have demonstrated that increasing income
tends to correlate to increasing political participation, as do Rosenstone and Hansen
(1993) , although they reach those conclusions fo r different reasons. Rosenstone and
Hansen(1993) conclude that people w ith higher levels o f income w ill be m obilized by the
parties and candidates to be participants. Verba, Schlozman, Brady (1994) insist that
those w ith more income gravitate toward political participation fo r personal gain and out
o f a personal interest. Conway, Steuernagel, and Ahern (1997) have found support for
this supposition as w ell. The research done by both Rosenstone and Hansen (1993) and
Verba, Schlozman and Brady (1994) indicate that increasing education increases
political participation, although again fo r differing reasons above.

H3: I expect to fin d that the education variable tends to fa vo r white women.
H 4: I expect to fin d that the income variable tends to fa vo r white women.
Both Rosenstone and Hansen (1993) and Verba (1994) find that the variables o f
income and education tend to favor Whites. As Zinn and D ill state (1994), there is a
different social location fo r racially ethnic women, and they are kept at this location by
upper class, W hite men and women. W hite men and women, according to Zinn and D ill
(1994) , systematically oppress both women and men who are in low er classes, as w ell as
those o f m inority religions, races, and ethnicities. Lorber states that W hite men (and
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thus their wives) tend to be the wealthiest and most educated in society, and this
statement is supported by Verba, Schlozman and Brady’s (1994) data.

H5: I expect to fin d that A frican American and Latino women participate at sim ilar
levels as White women at the higher income levels; and
H6: I expect to fin d that A frican American and Latino women participate at sim ilar
levels as White women at the higher education levels.
W hile W hite women w ill benefit the most from rising income and education, at
higher level o f income and education there w ill be an equalizing effect fo r all races.
Theories o f intersectionality suggest that people, especially women, tend to face
discrim ination and restrictions at varying levels due to class and race. W hile one cannot
change his or her race, one can change social class, though higher education and income.
I f intersectionality theories are correct, then we should see A frican American and Latino
women participate more at higher levels o f income and education. This effect should be
higher fo r A frican American women.

H7: I expect to fin d that regardless o f income and education, Latino women tend to be
slightly less participatory than African American women.
The Latino culture is s till very steeped in traditional roles fo r men and women.
Latino women w ill tend to see that men should be the ones to “ handle” the fam ilies’
political involvement. Latinos are disadvantaged, according to Verba, Schlozman, and
Brady (1994), in all spheres that can drive political participation - work, involvement in
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non-political organizations, income, language and education. This, coupled w ith the fact
that Latino participation is lower overall fo r both genders, should support this hypothesis.

H 8: I expect to fin d that there are statically im portant differences between women o f the
three races in the way they participate in politics.
M ultiracial fem inism suggests that each o f these groups encounter different
oppressions and have different levels o f income, education and opportunities to develop
civic skills. Thus, the types o f political participation which a member o f a group w ill
undertake should be different. Verba, Schlozman and Brady’ s (1994) data suggests that
there is quite a large difference in income, jobs and education fo r these women. I except
to find that W hite women give more campaign contributions, work on more political
campaigns, and actually run fo r office more than African-Am erican women, which is
significant. Lorber has demonstrated that the ideas, values, and policy preferences that
are held by a dominant group in a hierarchy control the political agenda.

H 9: I expect to fin d that White women have higher levels o f a ll form s o f p o litic a l
participation than African-Am erican or Latino women.
Verba, Schlozman and Brady have found that Whites tend to be more politically
active than other races. I f this is true, then W hite women should be more p o litica lly
active than their African-Am erican and Latino counterparts.

Summary o f Hypotheses
Hypothesis One: Increasing income makes all women more p o litica lly active.
Hypothesis Two: Increasing education makes all women more p o litica lly active
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Hypothesis Three: Income increases W hite women’ s political participation more.
Hypothesis Four: Education increases W hite women’s political participation more.
Hypothesis Five: A frican American and Latino women participate closer to the same
levels as W hite women at higher income levels.
Hypothesis Six: African American and Latino women participate closer to the same
levels as W hite women at higher education levels.
Hypothesis Seven: Latino women are the least participatory
Hypothesis Eight: There are compelling differences in the way women o f the three
races participate.
Hypothesis Nine: W hite women are more p o litica lly active overall.

Main Concepts and Variables
Voluntary P o litica l Participation
This paper w ill focus only on voluntary political participation. By voluntary I
mean political participation that was undertaken through no means o f coercion or
obligation, and activity that received no payment o f services (in other words, it is activity
that is not an extension o f a person's paid employment). P olitical participation is defined
as any human activity that is undertaken as a means o f influencing or having an effect on
governmental action, by either affecting the implementation o f public policy or
influencing the selection o f people who make public policy. This participation may take
the form o f voting, campaign work, making campaign contributions, contacting a public
official, attending a protest, and inform ally working in the community fo r a political
cause. The difference between these aforementioned forms o f political participation is
important, since each type requires different types o f resources and supplies different
types o f rewards fo r the participant.
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Forms o f P o litica l Participation
Voting sim ply refers to the human act o f going to the polls on election day and
casting a ballot in accordance w ith one's political preferences. Campaign work is any
human activity that is undertaken during a political campaign- such as making phone
calls, stuffing envelopes, engaging in "door to door" canvassing, putting up signs, or
other activities that are designed to influences the votes and preferences o f other people.
These activities are mostly voluntary, and receive no pay.
Making a campaign contribution involves the voluntary donation o f a private
citizen's personal funds to a political campaign. Contacting a public o fficia l is any
human activity that involves phoning, w riting, or speaking to a public o fficia l in order to
either sway his or her opinion on matters o f public policy, or to ask that new public
policy be initiated. Attending a protest is a human activity that involves attending an
organized meeting w ith the clear goal o f expressing disapproval at or influencing public
policy or opinion.
Inform al work in the community for a political cause is human activity that seeks
to influence a person's neighbors or members o f their peer group to undertake political
activity for a certain cause (which generally w ill benefit the group or community).

N on-Political A ctivity
Voluntary activity in both the religious and secular domains outside o f politics
affects political activity on several levels. This paper w ill examine some o f those
activities as they are often a politicizing experience. Certain activities, such as serving on
the PTA, helping w ith church fund drives, or serving on a neighborhood committee, may
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develop organizational and communication skills that are then directly applicable to
political participation. Some organizations that count on volunteer work, such as
churches, also often encourage volunteers to become p o litica lly active fo r certain causes.
W ork in organizations that take strong political stances, such as the National R ifle
Association, is not included, as the line between political and non-political activity here is
so blurred.

Measures o f P o litica l Resources
A ll o f the above forms o f political participation require the participant to give
some form o f a resource: time, money, or skill. Time is measured in hours - how many
hours do political activists spend on the above activities o f voting, attending protests,
contacting public officials, and campaign work. Money enters the activity o f making
campaign contribution — activists were asked by the researchers o f the Citizen's
Participatory Study (whose data w ill be used in this study) how much they gave to a
political cause or candidate. S kill is very d iffic u lt to measure - - it is too subjective on
both the part o f the participant and the researcher. Thus, this paper w ill measure skill in
the context o f the usage o f skills - the amount o f letter w riting and organizing meetings
that allow a person to practice these skills.

Demographic Variables
As this paper w ill examine the political participation rates o f W hite, AfricanAmerican, and Latino women, both in comparison w ith each other and men in each
group, the definitions o f race, ethnicity and gender are important. As data was gathered
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for the Citizen Participatory Study, respondents were asked fo r their race, ethnicity, and
gender. Thus, fo r the purposes o f this paper, race, ethnicity, and gender are self-defined:
each respondent placed him self or herself in the category in which they most identified.
For race, respondents were asked i f they classified themselves as Anglo-W hite, AfricanAmerican, Latino (all encompassing for those o f Mexican, Puerto Rican or Cuban
descent). The term "race" or "ethnicity" was used, because African-Am ericans tend to
identify themselves as a racial group, and Latinos tend to identify themselves as an ethnic
group. This does restrict the term "ethnicity" fo r the purposes o f this study (Verba,
Schlozman, and Brady, p. 99). N ationality sub-group differentiation (Irish-Am erican,
Italian-American) w ill not be examined here. Respondents were also asked which sex
they were: male or female.
The impact o f education and income on political participation w ill be measured,
as w ell as the level o f participation in non-political activities (as Verba states that these
translate into political skills). Education was measured in terms o f the grade level
obtained by the respondent. Income was defined as the average yearly income, based on
all earnings o f all household members (see attached appendix fo r the method in which the
Citizen Participatory Study categorized these divisions).
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CHAPTER 5: DATA AND METHODS
This study w ill use the data collected by the Public Opinion Laboratory o f
Northern Illin o is University and the National Opinion Research Center in Chicago during
the last 6 months o f 1989. The Citizen Participatory Study involved a two-stage survey
o f the voluntary political activity o f American citizens. The first stage o f the survey was
conducted as a short (15-20 minutes) telephone interviews w ith 15,053 nationally
represented, randomly chosen adults. The telephone interview gathered information
about voluntary activities, both political and non-political, as w ell as basic demographic
information.
The second stage o f the survey was conducted as in-person interviews. To select
respondents for the second stage interviews, the sample o f 15,053 people was reweighted
to account for several factors. In the first stage interviews, there was a slightly
disproportionate share o f women.

The sample was then classified according to race,

ethnicity, and gender, as w ell as by level and type o f political activity. African
Americans, Latinos, and political activists were oversampled, and the data regarding their
responses weighted to render a nationally representative sample. From these
respondents, longer (two-hour) interviews were conducted w ith 2,517 people. During
these interviews, respondents were asked about their activities both in the political and
nonpolitical arena. For political activity, respondents were asked questions about their
voting history, involvement in community activity or problems, campaign work,
campaign contributions, and contacting public officials. Respondents were also asked
their reasons for activity or inactivity, especially in the areas o f policy preferences
(motivated into action by certain issues - abortion, childcare, m ilitary issues, or means-
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tested benefits) or personal motivations (wanted to run fo r office, wanted to further their
career, etc.). Respondents were also asked about participation in non-political activities,
such as church, community groups, and jobs, as w ell as their income and education
levels.
Despite its age, the oversampling and weighting o f this data are one o f its
strengths fo r the purpose o f this study, as it w ill examine subgroups w ithin the American
population. This data has been weighted to make it representative o f the American
public by setting the effective sample size to 2,517. The authors explain the reason for
doing so is that "reweighting by the reciprocal o f the sampling weights ensures
statistically unbiased estimates o f means, regression coefficients, and other standard
statistics" (Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995 p. 536).
Alternative data sources, such as the data available from the National Election
Study (NES) or the General Social Survey (GSS) do not have a strong representative
sample o f either A frican Americans or Latinos - the 1996 NES polled only 207 African
Americans, as compared 1,454 Whites. A category fo r those o f Latino or Hispanic
ethnicity is not listed, and one can only assume that they are categorized under "Other."
W hile this data could be weighted, the data available from the Citizen's Participatory
Study has already been weighted. The NES also does not offer the fu ll spectrum o f the
political and social activities available through the Citizen's Participatory Study.
The main weakness o f this data from the Citizens Participatory Study is that it
was collected in 1989-1990. New research does suggest that the political participation o f
women, A frican Americans, and Latinos has risen significantly over the past decade, and
is credited to some extent to Clinton's successful election campaigns in 1992 and 1996.
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However, given the fact that more recent data is so unrepresentative o f these groups, I
feel that this is the best data set to be used. Also, I am comparing and contrasting my
findings against the framework developed by Verba, Schlozman and Brady, so it is best
to use the same data, so as not to skew results.

Methodology
This study w ill use a combination o f m ultivariate ordinary least squares
regression and m ultivariate logistic regression analysis. The m ultivariate ordinary least
squares regression w ill be used to compare the individual level determinants o f political
activity among men, women, A frican Americans, Latinos, and W hites when the
dependent variables are continuous. When the dependent variable is continuous, or
approximately continuous, then OLS w ill allow me to isolate the impact o f certain
independent variables, such as gender or race, w hile controlling fo r the impact fo r other
independent variables, such as income and education. Since the theory o f m ultiracial
feminism argues that differences between men and women w ill change w ith the
fluctuations in income and education (among other variables), it is necessary to control
for the impact o f these variables on participation when examining differences among
men, women, and m inorities. M ultivariate logistic regression w ill be used to compare the
individual level determinants o f political activity across men, women, A frican
Americans, Latinos and Whites when the dependent variable is dichotomous or lim ited,
since the use o f OLS in the case o f lim ited dependent variables is inappropriate (King,
Keohane, and Verba 1994).
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As such, several models w ill be used in this study. Many o f the models w ill
examine only one independent variable on one dependent variable (i.e. what is the
average impact o f education on Latino voting?). Many other models w ill examine the
average effects o f several o f the independent variables on several facets o f political
participation (i.e. how does income and education affect the overall (campaigning,
making donations, w riting letters, protesting) po litica l participation o f A frican American
women). This w ill enable me to control fo r many fluctuations in the impact o f these
variables across race and gender, which w ill be important fo r this study, as I am
examining political participation from the standpoint o f m ulti-racial feminism.
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CHAPTER 6: FINDINGS
Verba, Schlozman and Brady found that the impact o f income on political
participation was significant between men and women and between the races, although
they did not examine potential differences across class, race and gender at that time.
Also, income and education had a significant impact on voter turnout as w ell (see
literature review). Using their data, we can see early indicators o f significant differences
between the women in each o f these races, especially when income and education
differences are introduced.
First, I present the findings on voting correlated w ith race, education and gender
w ith two different approaches. To begin, I examine the impact o f income and education
on voting in tables that demonstrate the frequencies o f voter turnout among W hite,
A frican American and Latino women, grouped according to the level o f income or the
level o f education. Second, I test the impact o f education, income, gender, and race on
voter turnout in an interactive regression model.
Next, I present the findings on campaign contributions and campaign
volunteerism, again correlated w ith race, income, and education. These variables are
examined in a regression model.

Voting According to Income and Gender
One independent variable in my investigation is the average yearly household
income reported by the respondent, which is then broken into several different categories.
Verba, Schlozman and Brady divided the categories fo r income into divisions fo r every
5,000 dollars in income. In most o f these 5,000 dollar divisions, there is not a significant
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difference between groups, un til one reaches a certain threshold. For the purpose o f this
study, I have divided the groups into 5 categories: poor (average income under $20,000
per year), low er middle ($20 - 34,999 per year), middle (35,000 - 59,999 per year);
upper middle (60 - 99,999 per year), and upper (100, 000 and above per year), since
these are the income divisions that Verba, Schlozman, and Brady (1993) used in their
analyses.
In addition, respondents were asked to classify themselves according to race, and
were asked how often they voted in national elections: never, rarely, some, most, or all.
The questions asked i f the respondent was registered to vote and i f they had voted in
local, state, and national elections. The actual questions asked by Verba, Schlozman, and
Brady are contained in the appendix.

Findings in Voting Frequency Tables: Income and Race
The firs t method o f examination involves the frequency o f voting behavior.
Respondents were asked how frequently they voted in national elections, and these
reports are further divided by race. Table 1 clearly demonstrates the va lid ity o f Verba,
Schlozman and Brady’ s assertion that W hite women tend to vote more than African
American or Latino women. Here, we see that not only do W hite women vote more
often, but their participation rates increase according to levels o f income. Poor W hite
women have a low voting record, voting in most elections only 18.86% o f the time, and
voting in all elections only 39.63% o f the time. The low er middle class votes nominally
more w ith 20.99% voting in most elections, and 48.06 in all elections. M iddle class
women vote in most elections at the rate o f 22.27%, and increases to voting in all
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elections 62.44% o f the time. Upper middle class women vote in most elections 18.09%
o f the time and in all elections at the 66.66% level.

As shown in the table, these

percentages are consistently trending upward when correlated w ith income to the point
that 74.54% o f W hite women in the upper class vote in all elections, demonstrating that
income should positively influence voter turnout.
Comparing these frequencies w ith those o f A frican American women, the
hypothesis that A frican American women w ill vote more once we control fo r income is
supported in Table 1. In the middle, upper middle, and upper income levels, African
American women do vote at only slightly lower levels than W hite Women in the same
income groups. A frican American women at the middle income levels vote in most
elections at 17.54%, and in a ll elections at 50.87%. A t the upper middle income level
voting rises to 25% o f A frican American women voting in most elections, but decreases
nom inally to 45% in all elections. The upper income level show only a 2% difference
between W hite and A frican American women who vote in most elections, and only a 9%
difference between W hite and A frican American women in voting in all elections.
However, poor and lower income A frican American women are more like ly to
vote at these income levels than W hite women, which is significant. A t the poor income
level, 27.73% o f A frican American women vote in most elections, and 47.89% in all
elections, which is about 10% more than W hite women. A t the low er middle income
level, 68.62% o f A frican American women vote in all elections, which is slightly more
that 20% higher than the voting rates o f W hite women. One potential reason fo r these
patterns may be that A frican Americans perceive that there are certain benefits to be
accrued by voting, especially particularized benefits to A frican Americans and women
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that are viewed as the cornerstone o f Democratic party values (Verba, Schlozman and
Brady 1993; Judis and Texeireia 2002).
As shown in Table 1, Latino women are the least lik e ly to vote, at any income
level (controlling fo r the fact that there is only one respondent at the upper income level).
Their highest level o f voting takes place at the low er m iddle income level (see Table 1),
but even this rate is low er than any voting levels o f both W hite and A frican American
women. A t the poor income level, 43.05% o f Latino women never vote. O nly 11.11 % o f
Latino women vote in most elections, and 27.77% in a ll elections. It improves only
slightly at the next levels, as only 7.31% o f Latino women vote in most elections, and
36.58% in all elections at the low er m iddle income level. This is actually the highest
level o f voting in a ll elections. V oting decreases slightly when Latino women reach the
middle income level, as 15.78% o f Latino women vote in most elections and 31.57 in all
elections. A t the upper m iddle income level, voting in most elections improves (57.14%),
but declines again when voting in all elections to 28.57%.

Findings from Regression Analysis: Income and Race
The frequency rates o f voter turnout across income classifications appear to
support the arguments/hypothesis o f m ulticultural fem inist theories. In fact, I found that
as education and income increase, the rates o f voting by W hite and A frican American
women both tend to rise and correlate more closely w ith one another. However, A frican
American women tend to vote more that W hite women at low er income levels, which
may support some m ultiracial fem inist claims that oppressed groups w ill find certain
outlets from which to lobby fo r equality (Judis and Teixeiria 2002, p. 109; Baker 2002,
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p. 187)(Latinos tend not to vote regardless o f their income and education levels. One
possible explanation fo r the low participation level fo r Latino women is their tendency to
s till be more “ traditional” in the roles they take in society and fam ily, which includes
leaving political matters to men (Bakken and Farrington 2001, p. 177).
The problem o f simple analyses based on frequencies and other descriptive
statistics is that revealed patterns may result from spurious relationships. For example,
an apparent bivariate relationship between income and participation may be a spurious
relationship masking a true a correlation between ideology and participation particularly i f ideology and income are related. Consequently, in this section o f the
investigation I conduct multiple-regression analyses in order to better isolate the impact
o f income among W hite, A frican American and Latino women. To do this, I regress
voter turnout on several control variables including how religious they feel they are, if
they have children at home, i f they are married, where they place themselves on a
liberal/conservative scale (from extremely conservative to extremely liberal) and whether
or not the respondent is employed (see appendix fo r further discussion o f coding and
variables). I also include interaction terms between income, gender and race to test to see
o f the impact o f income significantly varies across race and gender o f respondents - as
predicted by m ultiracial fem inist theories. These additional variables are added as
“ interactive” variables in order to test the impact, or significance o f income among each
group (i.e. A frican American women) on the dependent variable. For example, the
interactive variable “ w oXinc” indicates the average impact o f a one unit increase in
income among W hite woman, holding everything else constant. The interactive variable
“ blkX inc” measures the average impact o f income on po litica l participation among
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African American males, holding everything else in the model constant. The interactive
variable “ w oXbl ” serves as a two-way interactive control variable fo r the impact o f being
an A frican American woman - regardless o f income. Im portantly, this variable does not
examine the impact o f income w ithin this group. The interactive variable “ w X bX inc,”
however, is a three-way interactive term measuring the average im pact o f a one unit
increase in income on po litica l participation among A frican Am erican women, holding
everything else in the model constant.
In Table 3 we see that, as previous literature im plies, fa m ily income is positively
associated w ith increased voting. In fact a one unit increase in fa m ily income is
associated w ith a .06 increase in the dependent variable, holding everything else in the
model constant. Further this effect is statistically significant at the .0003 level.
W hite women are not any more like ly to vote as W hite men, w hich is the base o f
comparision here, as evidenced by the “ woman” and “ w oX inc” variables. In other
words, the impact o f income on po litica l participation appears to be the same among
W hite men and women. A dditional levels o f income, once controls are made fo r other
variables included in the model, does not have a significantly different impact on the
probability o f engaging in po litica l activity among W hite women compared to W hite
men.
However, despite the apparent relationships presented in the simple frequency
tables, the regression model does not find that the impact o f income is significantly
different among A frican Americans. Table 3 clearly indicates that none o f the interactive
variables are statistically significant, which means that the impact o f income does not
appear to significantly vary among these groups. In other words, the effect o f income is
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statistically the same across all groups. The apparent patterns identified in the frequency
tables must be driven by factors other than income. This regression model does indicate,
however, that age and income do have a significant impact on voting, as both are
significant at the <.0001 level, but the impact o f income does not vary across racial
groups or between men and women. We should not assume that age is correlated w ith
race either, as studies have shown that across the board, people tend to vote more as they
get older, regardless o f other factors (see Rosenstone and Hansen 1993; Verba,
Schlozman and Brady 1993).
Table 4 shows the interactive regression model fo r Latino women and income.
Sim ilar to the interactive regression model fo r A frican American women, the interactive
variable “ w oX inc” measures the impact o f being a W hite woman and a one-unit increase
in income, holding everything else in the model constant. The interactive variable
“ laX inc” measures the impact o f income among Latino men, holding everything else in
the model constant. The interactive variable “ w o X a ” serves as a two-way control
variable fo r the effects o f being a Latino female regardless o f income level. The
interactive variable “ w X lX inc,” however, is a three-way interactive term measuring the
impact o f income among Latino women.
S im ilar to the findings w ith A frican American women, the effect o f fam ily
income is statistically the same across all groups. According to Table 4, the regression
model demonstrates that the interactive variable o f income on voting fo r Latino women
just misses being a significant factor at the 0.0778 level. A t least at conventional levels
o f statistical significance (i.e., a two-tailed significance test w ith p<.05) there are no
differences in the impact o f income among Latino women compared to W hite men. It is
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im portant, however, to note that a one-tailed test o f significance does reach conventional
levels o f acceptability (i.e., p<.05) w hich w ould indicate that the im pact o f income
among Latino women is actually significantly less than the im pact o f income among
W hite males. In other words, even when income levels rise among Latino women, they
s till do not reach the levels o f predicted p o litica l a ctivity o f W hite men once we control
fo r the effects o f the other variables in the model. Contrary to the predictions o f
m ultiracial fem inism , even when Latino women reach the highest levels o f income, they
are s till predicted to vote less than sim ila rly situated W hite males. Regardless, I do not
want to overstate this fin d in g because I am com m itted to the most conservative tests o f
statistical significance and want to, in general, rely on the tw o-tailed levels o f
significance. The patterns, however, are w orth noting and w ill be raised again in the
conclusions.
As in the previous regression model, education, age are both significant factors at
the <.0001 level, and the effect o f fa m ily income is s till significant to voting at the .0006
level. Thus, the regression model demonstrates that any correlation found in the
frequencies measuring the im pact o f rising income on voting, when race is a factor, is not
supported. A ll groups are affected by the level o f fa m ily income, education and age at
sim ilar levels.

V o tin g A cco rd in g to E duca tion and G ender
W hile income is certainly an indicator o f social class, and therefore an im portant
part o f testing the hypotheses o f m ultiracial fem inist theories, another im portant variable
indicating social status that must be considered is education. W hile education and
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income are certainly associated, there are im portant differences in their effects and some
extremely educated individuals do not have high incomes, and some individuals w ith
very high incomes possess very little education. Consequently, in the next section o f the
analysis, I w ill examine the hypotheses o f m ultiracial fem inism by using education as an
indicator o f social class. I hypothesize that increasing education w ill significantly lessen
the difference in voter turnout among W hite, A frican American and Latino women.
W hile Verba, Schlozman, and Brady separated education levels by every grade possible
in elementary through high school, and then per year attendance at college, they
combined these into 5 different levels fo r their regression models. For manageability, I
have kept these divisions in the frequency tables.
Respondents were asked what was the last grade or level o f education that they
had successfully completed. The divisions are as follow s:
Level
Level
Level
Level
Level

1:
2:
3:
4:
5:

No H igh School Diplom a
H igh School Diplom a
Some College, but no Diplom a
College Degree Obtained
Post College Degree obtained (Master's, Ph.D., JD, M .D. are all
combined).

Findings from Voting Frequency Tables: Education and Race
According to Table 5 increasing education appears to have a substantial
relationship w ith the voter turnout o f W hite and A frican American women. W ith each
new level o f education, percentages o f voter turnout increase. W hite women at the lower
education levels are slightly more like ly to vote than A frican American women,
demonstrating that there may be some significant differences in voter turnout according
to race alone. O nly 21.88 % o f W hite women w ith an education level o f 0 vote in both
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most or a ll elections, compared w ith 21.43% o f A frican Am erican women in most
elections and 28.47% o f A frican Am erican women in a ll elections at the same education
level. A t education level 3, most (66.67% ) A frican Am erican women vote in most
elections, yet the percentage declines considerably to only 6.67% o f A frican American
women voting in a ll elections. The percentages fo r voting in a ll elections at this
education level fo r W hite women is 60% and 50% fo r Latino women, so there may be a
negative relationship among A frican Am erican women at this level o f education. M ost
significantly, the more education A frican Am erican women attain, the more sim ilar are
their rates o f voting when compared to W hite women. A t education levels 3, 4 and 5 fo r
A frican Am erican women and W hite women, there is always some level o f voting, and
the levels o f voting in most or a ll elections is much higher than the national normal
voting rates. A t education level 4, there is only a 0.18% difference in the voting turnout
o f W hite women and A frican Am erican women, and at education level 5, there is only a
difference o f 4.76% in the voting turnout between W hite and A frican Am erican women.
For Latino women, though, the effect o f education on voting is significantly less.
A t the low er levels o f education (0, 1 and 2), it is clearly demonstrated in Table 6 that the
voting rates o f Latino women are comparable to those o f both W hite and A frican
American women, w hich does demonstrate the negative effect o f lack o f education on
voting. However, as the education levels rise fo r Latino women, their voting percentages
do not clim b as much as it does fo r W hite and A frican Am erican women (A t education
level 3, 50% o f Latino women vote in most or a ll elections, but this decreases to only
33.33% o f Latino women voting in most or a ll elections at education level 4. The sample
included only one Latino woman at the education level 5, and she voted in every election,
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but that frequency cannot be considered to be significant, since the n fo r that sample
group is only 1 (a problem that I w ill return to in the conclusions).
Intriguingly, when women o f all three races reach the highest level o f education
(level 5), voting decreased among them all. One reason fo r this could be the all sample
number at this level, or as studies have shown (see Verba, Schlozman, and Brady),
women at this level often have employment that requires more tim e than other
occupations, leaving less opportunity fo r political participation (again, another problem
that I w ill return to in my conclusions).

Findings from Voting Regression Models: Education and Race
The regression models in this part o f the analysis are sim ilar to the previous
m ultivariate models examining the impact o f income. Thus, in Table 7 the interactive
variable “ woXedu” measures the impact o f education among W hite women, holding
everything else constant. The interactive variable “ blkXedu” measures the impact
education among A frican American males, holding everything else constant. As before,
the interactive variable “ woXbl ” serves as a two-way control variable fo r the impact o f
being an A frican American women regardless o f education level. In addition, the main
variable o f interest is the three-way interaction term between “ wXbXedu” which
measures the impact o f education among A frican American women.
The interactive model displayed in Table 7 demonstrates that education alone is
statistically significant. The model indicates that increasing education is positively
associated w ith increased voting. In fact a one unit increase in education is associated
w ith a .15 increase in voting, In other words, increasing education by several years is
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estimated to increase voting by 1 until (or one race) controlling fo r sex, race, religion, and
income. Clearly, education plays an important role in predicting who w ill vote and who
wont.
Examining the interactions w ith race, however, the interactive model
demonstrates that education does not have a significantly different impact among African
American women. The parameter estimate fo r the impact o f education among African
American women is only significant at the .28 level - far from any conventional level o f
statistical significance. Regardless, age is s till a significant variable here, as in the
previous model.
Table 6 contains the interactive regression model fo r Latino women and
education. The regression model fo r education and interactive variables measures the
same independent variables as before, except that where the model tested fo r income
interactions it is now testing fo r education interactions. Thus, in Table 6 the interactive
variable “ woXedu” measures the impact o f education among W hite women and the
interactive variable “ laXedu” measures the impact o f education among Latino men. As
before, the interactive variable “ w oXl a” serves again as two-way control fo r the effects o f
being a Latino woman regardless o f education level. Finally, the interactive variable
“ w XlXedu” measures the impact o f education among Latino women.
This interactive model demonstrates that education does not have a significantly
different impact among Latino women. However, in this model, the effect o f education
among W hite women is significant. This model demonstrates that fo r every one-unit
increase in education, W hite women are more like ly to vote, as the model shows this
education variable to be significant at the 0.02 level. In other words, the model indicates

67

that, at least among W hite women, the effect o f education is significantly different from
the effects o f education among W hite men. W hile increased education is associated w ith
increased voter participation among both W hite men and women, sim ilar increases in
education are predicted to have a greater impact among W hite women. It is interesting
to note that w hile the impact o f income was found to be sim ilar among W hite men and
women, the impact o f education appears to be quite different - even in the face o f
controls fo r many related variables. Apparently, increases in voting among W hite
women may be attributed to increases in education more than increases in levels o f
income. I w ill return to the im plications o f these findings in the conclusion.
Overall, the model also demonstrates that age and fam ily income are also
significant predictors o f voting behavior.

Cam paign V olunteerism and E ducation
Verba, Schlozman and Brady (1993) found a significant lin k between education
and campaign volunteerism. Whenever a person increased in education, that person was
not only more like ly to vote, but also to volunteer time to a p o litica l campaign. Verba,
Schlozman and Brady (1993, p. 433) explain this increase in volunteerism when
education increases:
Education has a significant direct role w ith respect to each o f the participation
factors. It affects the acquisition o f skills; it channels opportunities fo r high levels
o f income and occupation; it places individuals in institutional settings where that
can be recruited to political activity; and it fosters psychological and cognitive
engagement w ith politics.
The measure o f campaign volunteerism in this study is how many hours a person donated
to a political campaign. Thus, it is measured as a unit o f time. Tim e is a commodity that
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is, in essence, lim ited equally for the rich and the poor, as there is the same amount o f
given time in a day fo r everyone. However, wealthier individuals can “ buy” more
personal time, in terms o f hiring household help or childcare. Therefore, significant
differences may be found in the effects o f education and income across race and sex for
this type o f political behavior.
In the previous investigation o f the impact on race and gender on voter turnout, I
examined both frequencies and regression models. In the next section o f the manuscript,
I w ill present only the m ultivariate regression models in an effort to save space
(descriptive statistics and frequencies are available by request).

Campaign Volunteering and Education: African American Women
Depicted in Table 8 is the interactive regression model examining interactions
between race and education and their impact on campaign volunteering. The model
indicates that education is not a significant factor fo r A frican American women when
predicting their levels o f volunteering fo r political campaigns. For every unit increase in
education for A frican American women, the effect is far from any conventional level o f
statistical significance. In fact, none o f the variables tested, including whether or not the
respondent has young children at home (which was more significant in Verba’ s model)
seems to impact how much time an African American woman w ill donate to a political
campaign.
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Campaign Volunteering and Education: Latino Women
Table 9 contains the interactive regression model fo r Latino women and the
impact o f education on campaign volunteerism. This interactive model demonstrates that
education alone is a significant predictor, which is consistent w ith findings in previous
models. For Latino women, though, the model demonstrates results very sim ilar to the
model examining A frican American women and campaign volunteerism. Latino women
demonstrate no increase in campaign volunteerism when education increases.
Overall, looking at campaign volunteerism, I find that education does not have
the significant effect that I predicted. In fact, none o f the variables tested in the education
model proved to be significant, which was not the case in Verba’ s study.

Campaign Contributions and Income
Verba, Schlozman and Brady (1993, p. 259) found significant differences in the
area o f campaign contributions where race and gender were concerned. Overall, men
tend to give more money than women when it comes to campaign contributions.

Whites

also tend to make more political contributions and give substantially more money than do
African Americans and Latinos when contributions are given (Verba, Schlozman and
Brady 1993, p. 236). Those in the higher income brackets are also much more like ly to
give than those in low er income brackets. Yet, Verba, Schlozman and Brady do not
examine i f campaign contributions equalize as incomes rise between the two sexes and
the three races.

70

Campaign C ontributions and Income: A frican American Women
The model presented in Table 9 demonstrates the impact o f income on whether or
not the respondent made campaign contributions. The model uses the same interactive
and independent variables as the previous models. Respondents were asked how much
money they had given to a po litica l campaign. Actual questions asked are available in
the appendix.
According to this model, the main effect o f fam ily income is a significant
predictor fo r whether or not a respondent to the survey gave money and a significant
predicator o f how much money they gave. The interactive terms, however, are not
significant at conventional levels o f statistical significance. In other words, the impact o f
income on the amount o f campaign contributions that respondents gave did not
significant vary across sex and race. The impact o f income was a significant predictor o f
giving but did not have different effects across groups.
Other significant factors in this model include education, w hich has been
significant in many o f the previous models. For every one-unit increase in education, we
should expect a .11 increase in giving campaign contributions. The test variable o f
R E LIG IO S ITY, which tests fo r the ‘re lig io sity’ o f a respondent, is very significant in this
model. S im ilarly the ideological variable is very significant —indicating that
conservatives were more lik e ly to give money than were liberals in this survey.
The variable fo r having children at home (C H ILD R E N A T HO M E) is also
statistically significant in this model. This like ly addresses the fact that those w ith
children at home have less disposable income to use on campaign contributions, since the
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impact is negative. For every one-unit increase in children at home, we should expect
campaign contributions to decrease .12 and this effect is significant at the 0.048 level.

Campaign Contributions and Income: Latino Women
In Table 10, we see that fam ily income is again a significant predictor o f
campaign contributions. S im ilar to previous models, however, we see that the impact o f
income is sim ilar across groups. The effects o f additional income have sim ilar impacts
among W hite women, Latino males, and Latino females.
Other significant factors in this model include education, which has been
significant in most o f the previous models. For every one-unit increase in education, we
should expect a .10 increase in giving campaign contributions - holding everything else
in the model constant. R eligiosity o f the respondents is also im portant in this model, as is
the ideological perspective o f the respondent. As before those respondents who were the
most conservative and the most religious were predicted to have contributed more holding all else constant. The variable fo r having children at home (C H ILD R EN A T
HOME) is also statistically significant in this model. For every one-unit increase in
children at home, we should expect campaign contributions to decrease .12. This is
statistically significant at the 0.05 level.
Overall, however, contrary to what I expected based on the theories o f m ultiracial
feminism, I did not find that increases in income had significantly different impact among
women who were also a member o f a m inority group. There are several reasons why this
current study may have been unable to fu lly uncover the relationships predicted by
m ultiracial fem inist theory. I return to these potential problems in the conclusion.

72

CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSIONS
Summary o f Findings
It is clear from previous research done in this area that education and income have
strong effects on po litica l participation. Most prior studies have demonstrated that the
“ participation gap” between men and women and the gap between races, especially
Whites and A frican Americans is narrowing (see literature review). There are many
reasons fo r these trends that have been presented in prior work. Women o f all races are
becoming better educated and earning more income. More women and m inorities are
beginning to successfully run fo r political office, which is also increasing their political
participation. A frican American women tend to be more employed and earn more
income than A frican American men, which Verba, Schlozman and Brady state is key to
their increasing m obilization.
Yet, according to my findings, neither education and income are the significant
predictors o f po litica l participation fo r women o f any race - or at least the impact o f these
variables is no different than their effect among W hite men. Given increases in education
and income, we should expect to see sim ilar increases in p o litica l participation among
sim ilarly situated men and women. O f course, to the extent that women fa ll behind men
in income and (especially) education, when levels o f these resources even out we should
continue to expect greater participation among women and m inorities. Regardless, my
findings suggest that, in general, the impact o f education and income is sim ilar across sex
and race.
Given the previous research I expected to find that increasing income and
education would not only consistently drive voting and other forms o f political
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participation upward, but also would have an “ equalizing” effect - as women earned
more money and became better educated, the racial differences would greatly narrow.
This is due to the theory o f m ultiracial feminism, which discusses the fact that oppression
is fe lt at varying levels, due to race, class and gender.
Overall, I found support fo r hypothesis one. I hypothesized that increasing
income would make women more p o litica lly active. This is certainly supported by the
frequency tables, and w hile the regression model specifically testing fo r income does not
show a significant correlation, the further models do demonstrate significance fo r the
variable o f fam ily income, which demonstrates the significance o f this variable. The
significance o f this is challenged by the fact that A frican American women actually vote
more at the low er income levels that do W hite or Latino women.
In hypothesis two, I expected to find that increasing education makes all women
more p o litica lly active. The frequency tables demonstrate that education is significant, as
W hite and A frican American women consistently vote more as their education increases.
This is not the case fo r Latino women. The regression model finds lim ited support for this
proposition.
Hypotheses three and four sought to demonstrate the effects o f m ultiracial
feminism. M ultiracial fem inism cast the W hite race as being dominant over other races.
I f this is the case, then I should have found that any increase to the resources o f the
women o f the dominant class gives them a significant advantage over other women.
W hile rising fam ily income and increasing education does increase po litica l participation,
it does not grant a significant advantage to W hite women.
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Hypotheses five and six sought to demonstrate that A frican American women and
Latino women would increase their political participation as their “ class” status rose
through increased education and income. M ultiracial fem inism suggests that class status
can either impede or support a person’ s ab ility to lobby fo r more equality. These models
tested whether or not women would make more campaign contributions i f their incomes
rose, and volunteer more tim e to political campaigns i f their education level increased.
Fam ily income was a significant variable in both these models, suggesting that increasing
income does play a significant role in political contributions. However, these variables o f
income and education were not found to be significant when tested in an interactive
model w ith being a woman and a member o f that particular race, which means that
increasing income is not that strong o f a factor in increasing their po litica l participation.
In these models, the more significant variables were the person’ s religiosity, how liberal
or conservative they consider themselves to be, and i f the respondent had young children
in the home.
In hypothesis seven, I expected to find that Latino women, despite gains through
income and education, s till lag behind W hite and A frican American women in terms o f
their overall participation. This hypothesis is supported by all frequency tables and
regression models in which variables concerning the participation o f Latino women are
introduced. Latino women certainly are the most disadvantaged o f these groups, in terms
o f political participation.
Hypothesis eight sought to examine the different paths that W hite, A frican
American and Latino women take in political participation. Latino women vote the least,
make fewer campaign contributions, and volunteer less time to campaigns. None o f these
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models show a method in which Latino women riva l W hite or A frican American women
in political expression. W hite women do tend to make more campaign contributions and
do more campaign volunteering at the upper income and education levels. A frican
American women tra il behind Whites in that area, but do vote a significant level,
especially at the low er income levels, where W hite women tend to vote the least.
Yet, I s till expected to find that W hite women s till hold the most po litica l capital
(hypothesis nine). The frequency tables show that W hite women w ill vote more as their
income and education rises. Some support was found that W hite women are more likely
to participate in campaign contributions and campaign volunteering.
In the follow ing table, I summarize the Hypotheses and the evidence found to
support or disprove the hypothesis.
Hypothesis One: Increasing income makes
all women more p o litica lly active.
Hypothesis Two: Increasing education
makes all women more p o litica lly active
Hypothesis Three: Income increases W hite
women’ s political participation more.
Hypothesis Four: Education increases
W hite women’ s po litica l participation
more.
Hypothesis Five: A frican American and
Latino women participate closer to the
same levels as W hite women at higher
income levels.
Hypothesis Six: A frican American and
Latino women participate closer to the
same levels as W hite women at higher
education levels.
Hypothesis Seven: Latino women are the
least participatory
Hypothesis Eight: There are compelling
differences in the way women o f the three
races participate.
Hypothesis Nine: W hite women are more

Supported.
Supported by frequency tables.
N ot supported by regression tables.
Not Supported.
Not Supported.

Tenuous support found fo r fam ily income.

N ot Supported

Supported.
Supported
Supported by frequency tables. Tenuous
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support in some models.

p o litic a lly active overall.

Problems with Current Research
These results m ust be considered prelim inary fo r several reasons. F irst, there are
too few females at the highest levels o f income and education fo r accurate comparisons.
For example, there was only one Latino woman in the study who has a high level o f
income, and only one Latino woman w ith a high level o f education. Therefore, we need
to w ait u n til women make fu rth e r advances before we are able to detect w ith some
accuracy whether or not the im pact o f education and incom e sig n ific a n tly vary across sex
and race. A lso, since women s till face glass ceilings then in a sense, Verba’ s study was
premature. W omen are gaining, but have not reached equality in education or income particularly given the large number o f women in the population.
W e must also be concerned w ith the fact that the data is over 10 years old. As
noted below , women and m inorities have made significant advances in terms o f p o litica l
power and clout.

Areas o f Further Research
Some o f the findings here challenge traditional th in kin g and em pirical research.
As noted above, it appears from some o f these findings that women and m inorities are not
as participatory p o litic a lly as one w ould expect to fin d . H ow ever, the data used here was
collected in 1990. In the elections o f 1992 and 1996, the votes o f women and m inorities
were considered to be lin ch p in o f C lin to n ’ s phenomenal success in those elections. In the
2000 election, the “ w om en’ s vote,” the “ Latino vote” and the “ A frica n Am erican vote”
replaced the “ labor vote” and the “ religious vote” as the ones to attract to the platform .
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Bush and Gore both reached out to these voter bases, often at the expense o f alienating
their core votes. Both presidential candidates made speeches in L a tin neighborhoods in
Spanish. Both courted the wom en’ s vote w ith strong stances on education w hile
distancing themselves fro m defense issues (Teixeira and Judis 2002).
The Republican party acknowledged the power o f the A fric a n Am erican vote by
several methods. T heir new “ compassionate conservative” message sought to change
long-held views in the A frica n Am erican com m unity that the Republicans were not
sympathetic to their problems. They also targeted their radio advertising in urban areas
to stations that predominately attracted A frican Am erican listeners (Teixeira and Judis
2002). It is obvious that these voting blocks are now seen as crucial to both parties.
Despite the Republican’ s best efforts to woo these m inorities to their side, Ruy
Teixeira and John Judis (2002) argue that the political participation o f women, Latinos,
and A frican Americans w ill drive the Democratic Party into m ajority status by the end o f
this decade. According to these authors, we should expect the stronghold that the
Republican party has had in Congress and the W hite House in the past 25 years to come
to an end, and mostly it w ill be due to the increasing participation o f women, A frican
Americans, Latinos, and Asian Americans. These groups have gained in the attainment
o f professional jobs, w hich should make them more able to participate, and they have
kept their core Democratic values. They have migrated to urban areas, and these factors
have created “ ideopolises” that w ill promote the core values o f the now-centrist
Democratic Party.
It is evident through the actions o f politicians and the arguments o f respected
scholars that the p o litica l participation o f women and m inorities is crucial to the
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American p o litica l system today. The weakness o f many o f these hypotheses in this
study should not be seen as discouraging news fo r organizers o f m ino rity politics. It is
obvious that this study needs to be redone using new and current data. Then, we shall
receive a better picture o f the state o f political participation o f women and minorities.
Current trends definitely show that these groups have p o litica l power today.
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VOTING FREQUENCIES
INTERACTIONS W ITH RACE AND INCOME

TABLE #1

A frican
American
Women
Poor
Never
Rarely
Some
Most
A ll

16.8
10.92
29.41
27.73
47.89

Lower
M iddle
17.64
11.76
11.76
11.76
68.62

M iddle

Lower
M iddle
13.25
3.86
11.6
20.99
48.06

M iddle

M iddle

Upper
M iddle
0.05
0.1
0.1
25
45

Upper

Upper
M iddle
3.8
1.9
7.61
18.09
66.66

Upper

Upper

31.57

Upper
M iddle
0

5.26
15.78
15.78
31.57

0
14.28
57.14
28.57

0
0
0
100

0.77
1.75
14.03
17.54
50.87

16.66
0
0
16.66
66.66

W hite
Women
Poor
Never
Rarely
Some
M ost
A ll

20.28
6.13
8.49
18.86
39.62

5.67
3.05
4.36
22.27
62.44

5.45
0
5.45
14.54
74.54

Latino
Women
Poor
Never

43.05

Lower
M iddle
17.07

Rarely
Some
Most
A ll

8.33
8.33
11.11
27.77

9.75
21.95
7.31
36.58
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0

VOTING FREQUENCY
INTERACTIONS W ITH RACE AND EDUCATION

TABLE #2

Figure 9:
African
American
Women
Never
Rarely
Some
Most
A ll
Figure 10:
W hite Women
Never
Rarely
Some
Most
A ll

educ = 0 educ = 1
19.34
20
7.14
6.36
21.43
18.18
21.43
17.27
28.47
31.82

educ = 2
13.33
6.67
6.67
66.67
6.67

educ = 3
0
6.25
3.13
18.75
68.75

educ = 4
0
0
5.56
27.78
66.67

educ = 5
0
0
0
50
50

educ = 0 educ = 1
33.33
13.88
4.17
6.41
13.54
9.96
21.88
20.28
21.88
44.84

educ = 2
6.67
4.44
8.89
17.78
60

educ = 3
5.08
1.69
3.95
17.51
68.93

educ = 4
0
1.3
3.9
23.38
71.43

educ = 5
0
0
25
25
50

educ = 0 educ = 1
35.82
30.51
8.96
3.39
8.96
16.95
4.48
8
19.4
23.73

educ = 2
0
0
0
50
50

educ = 3
0
0
33.33
33.33
33.33

educ = 4
0
0
0
0
100

educ = 5
100
0
0
0
0

Figure 11:
Latino Women
Never
Rarely
Some
Most
A ll
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Interaction Regression Model
Interactions with Voting and Income
African American Women
Table #3
Variable
Intercept

Parameter Estimate
2.26437

Standard Error
0.22571

Pr > t
<.0001

educ
age
black
woman
R E LIG IO S IT Y (respondent
committed to Christ
Faminc (Total household
income o f fam ily members
w oX inc
b lX inc
w oX bl
w X bX inc
L IB C O N
(liberal/conservative scale
married
unemp
C H ILD R E N A T H O M E
(how many children R has
livin g at home

0.16698
0.02132
-0.06497
0.11562
-0.01883

0.02323
0.00236
0.33048
0.18380
0.07578

<.0001
<.0001
0.8442
0.5294
0.8038

0.06410

0.01788

0.0003

-0.02394
-0.02809
-0.05269
0.03260
0.01949

0.002218
0.04005
0.39274
0.05117
0.02726

0.2807
0.4832
0.8933
0.5241
0.4747

0.02015
-0.37514
0.04983

0.08560
0.30206
0.03173

0.8139
0.2145
0.1166

R-square = 0.1426
Adjusted R-square = 0.1344
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Interaction Regression Model
Interactions with Voting and Income
Latino Women
Table #4
Variable
Intercept
educ
age
latin
woman
R E LIG IO S IT Y (respondent
committed to Christ
Faminc (Total household
income o f fa m ily members
w oX inc
laXinc
w oX la
w X IX in c
L IB C O N
(liberal/conservative scale
married
unemp
C H ILD R E N A T H O M E
(how many children R has
livin g at home
R-square = 0.1437
Adjusted R-square = 0.1355

Parameter
Estimate
2.26478
0.16649
0.02118
-0.07927
0.03496
-0.04102

Standard Error

Pr > t

0.22421
0.02339
0.00236
0.38935
0.17537
0.07436

<.0001
<.0001
<.0001
0.8387
0.8420
0.5813

0.05992

0.01741

0.0006

-0.01003
-0.00169
0.69461
-0.13533
0.02621

0.02099
0.05265
0.48312
0.07668
0.02672

0.6327
0.9744
0.1507
0.0778
0.3268

0.03930
-0.40148
0.04488

0.08468
0.030179
0.03158

0.6426
0.1836
0.1555
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Interaction Regression Model
Interactions with Voting and Education
African American Women
Table # 5
Variable
Intercept
educ
age
black
woman
R ELIG IO SITY (respondent
committed to Christ
Famine (Total household
income o f fam ily members
woXedu
bl Xedu
w oX bl
wXbXedu
LIB C O N
(liberal/conservative scale
married
unemp
C H ILD R EN A T H O M E
(how many children R has
living at home
R - square = 0.1434
Adjusted R-square = 0.1351

Parameter Estimate
2.40536
0.15572
0.02170
0.09842
-0.24605
-0.02066

Standard Error
0.20593
0.02900
0.00237
0.65392
0.31125
0.07577

Pr > t
<.0001
<.0001
<.0001
0.8804
0.4294
0.7852

0.04800

0.01237

0.0001

0.01345
-0.02954
-0.63358
0.06621
0.02048

0.02268
0.04866
0.81863
0.06210
0.02712

0.5534
0.5440
0.4391
0.2866
0.4518

0.00855
-0.38030
0.05507

0.08506
0.30165
0.03170

0.9200
0.2076
0.0825
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Interaction Regression Model
Interactions with Voting and Education
Latino Women

Table # 6
Variable
Intercept
educ
age
latin
woman
RELIGIOSITY (respondent
committed to Christ
Famine (Total household
income of family members
woXedu
laXedu
woXla
wXlXedu
LIBCON
(liberal/conservative scale
married
unemp
CHILDREN A T HOME
(how many children R has
living at home

Parameter
Estimater
2.40284
0.14111
0.02138
0.75052
-0.77001
-0.03719

Standard Error

Pr > t

0.20759
0.02851
0.00237
.65621
0.33026
0.07433

<.0001
<.0001
<.0001
0.2529
0.0199
0.6170

0.04870

0.01246

<.0001

0.05411
-0.07958
0.74284
-0.05006
0.02805

0.02384
0.05545
.084165
0.07166
0.02661

0.0234
0.1514
0.3776
0.4849
0.2920

0.02336
-0.35054
0.04810

0.08404
0.30106
0.03152

0.7811
0.2445
0.1272
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Interactive Regression Model
Interactions with Campaign Volunteering and Education
African American Women
Table # 7
Variable

Intercept
educ
age
blk
woman
R ELIG IO SITY (respondent
committed to Christ
Famine (Total household
income o f fam ily members
woXedu
blXedu
woXbl
wXbXedu
LIB C O N
(liberal/conservative scale
married
unemp
C H ILDREN A T HOM E
(how many children R has
living at home

Parameter Estimate
14.15706
-0.42769
-0.04021
11.89281
-3.19283
-0.41100

Standard Error
3.53743
0.47673
0.04249
9.79200
7.68292
1.24387

Pr > t
<.00001
0.3706
0.3450
0.2259
0.6781
0.7414

-0.09049

0.19568

0.6442

0.16017
-0.68138
0.588926
0.35504
-0.30877

0.51003
0.66943
14.44135
0.99284
0.41565

0.7538
0.3099
0.6838
0.7210
0.4584

-0.91835
0
0.05406

1.56253
0
0.47404

0.5573
0
0.9093

R-square = 0.0520
Adjusted R-square = -0.0048
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Interactive Regression Model
Interactions with Campaign Volunteer W ork and Education
Latino Women
Table # 8
Variable

Intercept
educ
age
Latin
woman
R ELIG IO SITY (respondent
committed to Christ
Famine (Total household
income o f fam ily members
woXedu
blXedu
woXbl
wXbXedu
LIB C O N
(liberal/conservative scale
married
unemp
C H ILDREN A T HOM E
(how many children R has
living at home

Parameter Estimate
16.335854
-0.84249
-0.03359
-10.50736
-5.42352
0.11610

Standard Error
3.48673
0.45537
0.04157
11.23828
7.25560
1.17538

Pr > t
<.0001
0.0657
0.4199
0.3508
0.4556
0.9214

-0.16162

0.19801

0.4153

0.27487
0.53307
9.01459
-0.82415
-0.41074

0.47877
1.01760
22.51904
2.03036
0.40045

0.5665
0.6009
0.6893
0.6852
0.3062

-1.01143
0
0.12746

1.54971
0
0.46889

0.3062
0
0.7860

R-Square = 0.0513
Adjusted R-square = -0.0056
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Interactive Regression Model
Interactions with Income and Campaign Contributions
African American Women
Table # 9
Variable

Intercept
educ
age
black
woman
RELIGIOSITY (respondent
committed to Christ
Faminc (Total household
income of fam ily members
woXinc
blXinc
woXbl
wXbXinc
LIBC O N
(liberal/conservative scale
married
unemp
CHILDREN A T HOME
(how many children R has
living at home

Parameter Estimate
-0.00332
0.11159
-0.00210
1.11820
-0.04003
0.29841

Standard Error
0.46816
0.04451
0.00510
0.78062
0.46206
0.14782

Pr > t
0.9943
0.0125
0.6807
0.1527
0.9310
0.0441

0.22159

0.03434

<.0001

-0.04243
-0.14415
-0.97111
0.11810
0.08404

0.04596
0.07939
0.95355
0.10146
0.05025

0.3564
0.0701
0.3090
0.2451
0.0952

-0.11653
1.79680
-0.12533

0.18068
1.03452
0.06346

0.5193
0.0831
0.0489

R-square = 0.2450
Adjusted R-square = 0.2206
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Interactive Regression Model
Interactions with Campaign Contributions and Income
Latino Women
Table # 10
Variable

Intercept
educ
age
Latin
woman
RELIGIOSITY
(respondent committed to
Christ
Faminc (Total household
income of fam ily members
woXinc
laXinc
woXla
wXlaXinc
LIBCON
(liberal/conservative scale
married
unemp
CHILDREN A T HOME
(how many children R has
living at home

Parameter Estimate
0.17757
0.10872
-0.00156
-0.54581
-0.22747
0.28849

Standard Error
0.45818
0.04455
0.00511
1.18325
0.41419
0.14569

Pr > t
0.6985
0.0151
0.7610
0.6448
0.5831
0.0483

0.19751

0.03277

<.0001

-0.02185
0.05205
1.03267
-0.29060
0.09647

0.04161
0.13062
2.20147
0.31871
0.04862

0.5998
0.6905
0.6392
0.3624
0.0479

-0.14576
1.83880
-0.12256

0.18056
1.02498
0.06334

0.4200
0.0735
0.0537

R-square = 0.2413
Adjusted R-square = 0.2169

89

Bibliography
Ayres, Ian. 1991. “ Fair driving: Gender and race discrimination in retail car
negotiations” . H arvard Law Review, 104, 817-872.
Baker, Jean. 2002. Votes for Women: The Struggle for Suffrage Revisited. New York,
Oxford University Press.
Bakken, Gordon and Brenda Farrington. 2001. The Gendered West. New York,
Garland.
Campbell, Angus, Converse, Philip, M iller, Warren and Stokes, Donald 1964 The
American Voter New York, John W iley and Sons, Inc.
Collins, Gail. 2003. America’ s Women: 400 years o f Dolls. Drudges. Helpmates, and
Heroines. New York, W illia m Morrow.
Conway, Margaret, Steuemagel, Gertrude, and Ahern, David 1997 Women and Political
Participation: Cultural Change in the Political Arena Washington D. C.
Congressional Quarterly Press
Federal Election Commission. 1998. Voter Turnout Statistics, by Race, 1972 - 1996.
Janda, Kenneth, Berry, Jeffrey, and Goldman, Jerry 1999 The Challenge o f Democracy
Boston H oughton-M ifflin
Judis, John and Ruy Teixeiria. 2002. The Emerging Democratic Majority. New York,
Scribner.
King, Gary, Keohane, Robert O. and Verba, Sidney 1994 Designing Social Inquiry
New Jersey, Princeton University Press.
Lawson, Steven. 1985. In Pursuit o f Power: Southern Blacks and Electoral Politics,
1965 - 1982. New York, Columbia Press.
Lorber, Judith 1998. Gender Inequality: Feminist Theories and Politics Los Angeles,
Roxbury Publishing Company.
Mansbridge, Jane 1996. "Reconstructing Democracy". In Revisioning the Political:
Feminist Reconstructions o f Traditional Concepts in Western Political Theory.
Hirschmann, Nancy J. and D i Stephano, Christine, eds. Boulder, Westview Press.
Malveaux, Julianne and Deborah Perry. 2002. Unfinished Business: A Democrat and A
Republican Take on the 10 Most Important Issues Women Face. New York, Berkley
Publishing.

90

M iller, Warren and J. M e rrill Shanks 1996 The New American Voter Cambridge,
Harvard University Press
Rosenstone, Steven J. and Hansen, John M. 1993. M obilization. Participation, and
Democracy in America. New York, M acM illian Publishing Group.
Shlozman, Kay L., Bums, Nancy, Verba, Sidney 1994. “ Gender and the Pathways to
Participation: the Role o f Resources” . The Journal o f P olitics, Vol. 56, no. 4,
November 1994. Pp. 963-90.
_____ . and Donahue, Jesse 1995. “ Gender and Citizen Participation: Is there a
Different Voice?” American Journal o f P o litica l Science, Vol. 39, No. 2, May
1995, Pp. 267-93.
Tate, Gayle. 1993. Unknown Tongues: Black Women’ s Politcal A ctivism in the
Antebellum Era 1830 -1860.
Teixeira, Ruy 1992 The Disappearing American Voter Washington D. C. Brookings
Institution
________. 1992 "10 Myths about Voter Turnout." The Brookings Review Fall 1992 Pp.2931.
Stephenson, Gilbert T. 1911. Race Distinctions in American Law. New York, D.
Appleton Co.
Uhlaner, Carol J. “ Political Participation and Discrimination: A Comparative Analysis of
Asians, Blacks, and Latinos” 1991 appears in Political Participation and the
American Democracy. Crotty, W illiam , ed. Westport, Ct. Greenwood Press.
Verba, Sidney, Schlozman, Kay, and Brady, Henry 1993. “ Race, Ethnicity and Political
Resources: Participation in the United States” . B ritish Journal o f P o litica l
Science, Vol. 23, Pp. 453-97.
_____ .1995. Voice and Equality .

Cambridge, Harvard University Press.

______ . “ Knowing and Caring about Politics: Gender and Political Engagement.” The
Journal o f P olitics, Vol. 59, No. 4, November 1997, Pp. 1051-72.
______ . “ The Big T ilt: Participation Inequality in America.” The American Prospect,
May-June 1997, Pp. 74-80.

91

Wielhouwer, Peter and Brad Lockerbie. 1994. “ Party Contacting and Political
Participation 1952 - 1990” . The American Journal o f P o litica l Science. Volume 38, No
1. Feb 1994, pp. 211 -2 2 9 .
Wilson, W illiam Julius. The Bridge over the Racial Divide. Berkeley, University of
California Press.
Zinn, M. B. "What is M ulticultural Feminism?" This version appears in Gender
Inequality: Feminist Theories and Politics. Lorber, Judith, ed. Los Angeles, Roxbury
Publishing Company.

92

